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U.S. MARINE CORPS. 1ST. DIVISION.

FINAL REPORT ON GUADALCANAL OPERATION.

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## DIVISION COMMANDER'S FINAL REPORT ON THE GUADALCANAL OPERATION *sv. A*

PHASE IV  
(20 August - 18 September)

### Introduction

While the action at Matanikau on 19 August had effectively dispersed the last of the original enemy garrison on Guadalcanal, there were strong indications that an effort would be made to regain possession of the island with fresh troops. However the total lack of aircraft prevented effective reconnaissance except of the limited areas within reach of ground patrols and it was not until 19 August, when a combat patrol wiped out a party of Japanese a days march to the east, that an attack appeared imminent. At that time four of our battalions were holding prepared beach defenses and a short flank extension along the Tenaru, the remaining battalion being kept in hand for counterattack. Patrolling and security measures were increased, particularly on the eastern flank.

### Battle Along the Tenaru

During the early hours of the night 20-21 August listening posts established east of the Tenaru fired flares and fell back on the main position reporting enemy movement to the east. This was followed by a small amount of rifle fire but neither fact was considered of particular significance as minor affrays with small enemy parties were of almost nightly occurrence.

At 0310, however heavy firing was heard from the mouth of the river where its channel, in dry weather, is blocked from the sea by an exposed sand spit some 100 yards in width. This bar was covered by a 37mm gun of the Special Weapons Battalion supported by a few machine guns and a small group of riflemen of the 2nd Bn 1st Marines (Pollock) which garrisoned the sector. It was against these light defenses that the enemy delivered their first assault - a quick surprise thrust across the bar by some 200 enemy infantry attacking in mass formation. The position was not wired in and the enemy at first gained some success, breaking into the position and securing possession of some of the emplace-

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ments. In this initial assault the enemy lost heavily from the effect of the canister and machine gun fire which swept his exposed route of approach. Positions which were not overrun maintained their fire and the Japanese were unable to reorganize or extend their foothold within our lines. Shortly thereafter Company G, in battalion reserve, reached the point of contact and launched a counterattack which succeeded in restoring the position and driving the enemy back across the bar.

Additional forces were soon involved on both sides and the action developed into a fire fight at close range. The Japanese placed heavy concentrations of artillery, mortar and machine gun fire on our positions at the end of the sand bar in an effort to blast a gap in the defenses. On the other side of the river the 2nd Battalion strengthened its positions and, taking advantage of the opportunity for enfilade afforded by the reentrant trace of the river, swept the enemy line with the flanking fire of their infantry weapons. At 0400 and again at 0515 prepared artillery concentrations were placed on the Japanese positions by 3rd Bn 11th Marines. Although observation was difficult because of the darkness the fire appeared to be well placed and effective.

By daybreak it was apparent that the 2nd Battalion, although seriously outnumbered at the actual point of contact, had gained definite fire superiority due to its advantage of position and strong artillery support. The enemy force did not appear to exceed one reinforced battalion and it was decided to pass the division reserve battalion across the river to effect an envelopment. Accordingly 1st Bn 1st Marines (Cresswell) was ordered to cross the river at a point upstream from the enemy position and move against the enemy's exposed left flank and rear. The order was executed promptly and at 0950 the battalion commander was in position to begin the first phase of his attack a movement to the north and northwest to gain the hostile rear.

Company C (Stevenson), advancing on the right, reached the beach in the vicinity of Block Four Village where it encountered an enemy force of one platoon with machine guns. Company C advanced the attack, rapidly moving one platoon to the left to isolate the enemy group from the main body at the Tenaru. The hostile reaction took the form of the customary bayonet charge which was beaten off with heavy losses. Thereupon Company C closed in and bayoneted the survivors.

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Company A (Brush), on the left, moved north and then northwest without opposition. By 1230 both companies changed direction to the west to reach the rear of the main enemy position. On the left a detachment of Company D was employed to prevent a hostile movement to the south. As the advance continued the enemy was forced into a confined position at the mouth of the Tenaru. Several efforts to break through toward the south were stopped by the Company D detachment and by 1400 the enemy was completely encircled. Some attempted to escape out to sea but were picked off by rifle fire. Before the maneuver was completed several groups attempted to make their way eastward along the beach but were destroyed or turned back by fighter aircraft which had arrived the previous day.

To conclude the engagement before nightfall a light tank platoon (Case) crossed the sand spit at 1500 and attacked the enemy position with canister and machine gun fire. Two tanks were disabled, one by an anti-tank mine, but the crews were rescued by the close supporting action of other tanks. Following the tank attack the infantry closed on the position and mopped up the remaining resistance.

By 1700 the operation was completed with almost complete annihilation of the enemy. It is estimated 900 Japanese were killed. One surrendered and fourteen were taken prisoners. Only two of the prisoners were unwounded. Our losses were thirty-four marines killed and seventy-five wounded.

The following items of enemy materiel were captured:

- 10 Heavy Machine Guns.
- 20 Light Machine Guns.
- 20 Heavy Grenade Throwers.
- 700 Rifles.
- 20 Pistols.
- Undetermined number of sabres and hand grenades.
- 3 70mm Battalion Guns.
- 12 Flame Throwers (never used in operation)
- Demolition equipment including large quantities of prepared TNT charges, anti-tank mines and bangalore torpedoes.

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Mopping up operations following the engagement along the Tenaru indicated that the enemy force of about 1100 men had been almost entirely destroyed. Those who survived were reported drifting to the east and pillaging native gardens to obtain food. However, it soon became apparent that the Japanese had by no means abandoned their basic design of recovering the airfield. Air patrols indicated that hostile surface vessels were making regular trips to Guadalcanal, and at sunset on 24 August scout bombers attacked a hostile surface force of cruisers, destroyers and transports 150 miles northwest of Guadalcanal. They inflicted heavy damage, probably sinking a cruiser and a large transport, and damaging other vessels. At 0200 2 September a second enemy task force was attacked near Taivu while engaged in landing troops. Meanwhile the intensity of enemy air attacks on our positions was steadily increased.

It was plain that the enemy was building up a second and larger force to the east of Lunga Point and it was equally clear that some form of offensive action on our part would be necessary. The means and methods were the only questions. The remaining battalion of the Fifth Marines rejoined from Tulagi on 21 August and consideration was given employing it in an operation to the east. However the enemy was again showing strength in the Matanikau area and there were indications that he had reinforced his position there with fresh troops. A renewed attack thus might assume the nature of simultaneous assaults on both flanks. The left (west) flank of the position was not a strong one and could be easily turned by a force moving along the open ridges in the defensive gap between the terminus of the flank extension and the Lunga River. The additional battalion was for these reasons assigned as a mobile reserve for the Fifth Marines, then holding the sector west of the Lunga.

#### Kokumbona Operation

Pending the development of plans for a new operation, a battalion of the Fifth Marines participated in a minor and unsuccessful action near Kokumbona on 27 August. This was a shore to shore operation which involved landing the battalion west of the village while an additional company moved overland by trail to intercept any hostile withdrawal inland. Artillery support was provided. The success of the operation depended upon the rapid movement by the battalion after the landing in order to strike the enemy from the west before he had time to bring about a redistribution of forces to cover his rear. However, the movement of

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the battalion was incredibly slow and its leadership irresolute and faltering. Little effort was made to utilize the terrain by moving a portion of the battalion along the open ridges inland from the beach to outflank the enemy from high ground. Instead, and contrary to plan, the main body was committed to a frontal assault which soon bogged down. At the direction of this headquarters the regimental commander proceeded to the scene late in the afternoon, relieved the responsible officers and assumed tactical direction of the operation. The attack was resumed at daybreak the following morning, but the opportunity was gone, the enemy having withdrawn during the night. Our losses were 5 killed and 18 wounded. Only 20 enemy dead were counted. The operation had accomplished nothing beyond establishing the fact that the enemy to the west was not in great force.

#### Tasimboko Operation

Meanwhile preparations were made for an operation to the east. Native scouts reported that 200-300 well armed, well equipped troops held Tasimboko with defensive works west of the village faced to meet an attack from the west along the coast or astride the government track.

Fresh troops were available on Tulagi and authority was obtained to employ APD's (destroyer transports) in a minor landing operation. In accordance with this plan the First Raider Battalion and First Parachute Battalion were moved to Lunga Point. Both units were rested but understrength, the parachute battalion being particularly handicapped by a shortage of senior officers, resulting from casualties incurred on 7 August. In view of this shortage the battalion was attached by companies to the raider battalion under command of Colonel Edson.

As the APD's were to be available for only a limited period of time, it was necessary to complete the operation in a single day. As in the Kokumbona operation the plan entailed a landing beyond the objective (Tasimboko) followed by a movement designed to strike the enemy from the rear. On the eve of the operation additional information from native sources indicated a hostile strength of several thousand and this necessitated a re-consideration of the entire plan. It was considered that while the enemy had unquestionably been reinforced by night landings the figure reported by the native scouts was excessive and the decision was reached to carry out the operation as scheduled.

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The landing was made at dawn on 8 September without detection by the enemy. Unguarded arms and equipment were found near the landing beach and circumstances indicated that additional enemy forces had landed at the same point during the night. The landing force took up an attack formation and advanced to the west toward Tasimboko. Contact was made shortly after daybreak and the initial assault overran the enemy rear guard and succeeded in capturing a battery of artillery. The attack was maintained in the direction of the village with continuous air support by scout bombers and army P-400's. Resistance increased as the outskirts of the village were reached and it appeared that the engagement might have to be broken off. However, as the attack was pressed home, the Japanese evacuated the village, leaving behind them large stores of rice, medical supplies, arms, and ammunition and a number of landing boats and barges. Contact was lost at 1230 and Colonel Edson destroyed the village together with the abandoned stores before withdrawing. Our losses were two killed and 6 wounded. Twenty-seven enemy dead were counted by the raiding force.

The action at Tasimboko resulted in the destruction of the enemy's base, the loss of part of his artillery, and a large part of his essential supplies. This was to have a favorable effect on the operations to follow. The conduct of the Japanese on this occasion is difficult to understand. They were present in the Tasimboko area in overwhelming numbers (3-4000) yet they abandoned their vital base after an indecisive action involving only a fraction of their troops. In explanation it may be offered that this failure may have been only a manifestation of the peculiar Japanese system of command, which, it has been stated, does not embrace the principle of mutual assistance by neighboring units except at the direction of a common superior.

Following this operation patrols and native scouts reported on enemy movements which showed unmistakably that strong columns were moving west and southwest from Tasimboko along routes leading to bivouac areas to the south and southeast of our main positions. Small patrol encounters were of daily occurrence and it became increasingly difficult to penetrate the area to the east. In preparation for attack our right flank extension was completed and strengthened and the Raider Battalion, in division reserve, was charged with the development of a defensive position on an open ridge south of the airfield which constituted a dangerous avenue of approach to our rear. To the right rear of the raiders' position the pioneer battalion was bivouacked near the Lunga and

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established a covering position to intercept any attempt at a movement down the right (east) bank of the Lunga. The engineer battalion was bivouacked in echelon to the left rear of the raider battalion to afford some protection against any movement through the heavy jungle east of the ridge. None of these positions were complete or well organized as the dense jungle represented a terrific obstacle to be overcome only by weeks of labor at a time when it was all too obvious that only days remained to us.

Little could be done to close the defensive gap from the Lunga westward to the sea. The pioneers established a strong point on a hill just east of the river, and in the center of the gap a detachment of the Amphibian Tractor Battalion organized a strong point on an open ridge which commanded the main overland approach from the west. These measures were not altogether promising of a successful defense against a well coordinated attack but they represented the utmost that could be accomplished with available troops operating in extremely unfavorable terrain. A penetration of the position was almost a certainty but it was expected that the reserve could be employed to contain any breakthrough before it reached the vital area surrounding the airfield. (Annex J Defensive dispositions on 13 September).

By 11 September activity was increasing rapidly in that area east of the Lunga lying to the south and southeast of our position. On the 12th the Raider Battalion undertook a reconnaissance in force along the ridge and met strong resistance. During the night of 12 September there was a continuous and confusing series of encounters along the sketchy position held by the Raiders. At one point there was a breakthrough and lateral contact was not reestablished until the following afternoon. Apparently the fact of the breakthrough was not known to the enemy commander for he failed to exploit it. There was also some activity along the Lunga and to the west and our position was subjected to a prolonged bombardment by naval gunfire.

On the morning of the 13th the Raiders again attempted to advance. Hard fighting took place during the day but the enemy resistance was strong and results were inconclusive. The troops were utterly exhausted by their prolonged period of sustained combat and it was obvious to a staff officer who visited them on the afternoon of the 13th that their situation would become increasingly grave during the night. In the late afternoon

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the Raiders suspended their attack in order to reestablish their line for the night in a slightly withdrawn position. The new line had the advantage of stronger ground and tended to deceive the enemy by presenting a different front from the one offered the previous night. On the right this withdrawal permitted the establishment of a tenuous connection with the Pioneer Battalion but the left was still uncovered. Positions were hastily organized and every effort was made to establish a defense prior to nightfall.

Meanwhile, in view of the situation of the Raider Battalion, it was decided to effect their relief the following morning. Accordingly the Second Battalion, Fifth Marines (Whaling) in division reserve west of the Lunga, was moved across the river to a position along the southern edge of the airport disposed in depth with respect to both the Raider and Pioneer Battalions preparatory to relief on the following morning.

#### Battle of Edson's Ridge

The situation confronting the Raider Battalion at sunset on 13 September was far from promising. Their lines were intact and their communications restored but the battalion itself was faced with the necessity of holding a long and vulnerable front with a reduced strength of men already exhausted and shaken by forty-eight (48) hours of gruelling combat. The bare ridge extending normally to their front formed the backbone of their position and was held by Company B. On the left, where the main line of resistance dropped sharply away to a dense, unbroken jungle flat two small companies of parachutists were disposed to protect the open left flank. On the right, Company A held the area between the ridge and the Lunga maintaining a tenuous contact with the Pioneer Battalion which held both banks of the river. Company C was held in battalion reserve.

A continuous cordon defense was impossible due to the terrain and the small numbers of the holding garrison. Units were organized in small combat groups of about platoon strength disposed at intervals along the main line of resistance. There were open fields of fire only in the center of the position where the main line of resistance crossed the ridge but even here the abrupt slopes and broken ground made coordination of fires difficult. In the remaining hours of daylight the troops dug foxholes and cleared limited fields of fire. By nightfall the position was

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consolidated but under the circumstances was neither continuous nor complete, certainly not to the extent necessary to resist a strong attack.

During the 13th the increasing enemy air activities of the previous days were brought to full pitch. The first attack, at daylight, was turned back but at 1020, 1320 and again at 1750 bomber flights with strong zero escorts were pressed home. The field and the vicinity of the ridge were subject to repeated and intensive bombardment.

As soon as it was dark the enemy began his attack. The main enemy force, moving down the ridge, engaged the center of Colonel Edson's position frontally while a strong detachment moved through the jungle west of the ridge and struck on a narrow front against the position held by the right flank platoon of Company B. The platoon was surrounded and almost overwhelmed but succeeded in fighting its way to the ridge where it joined Company C in battalion reserve. This resulted in isolating the right flank company and exposing the vital central ridge to attack from the west by troops moving through the gap thus created.

The enemy was quick to follow up this advantage and moved strong parties through the opening to positions on the right flank of Company C. Additional and smaller groups infiltrated at other points disrupting wire communications and rendering control difficult. Since it was obvious that the ridge had become the immediate point of attack, Company B's lines were reestablished by refusing the right flank along the western slopes to forestall the inevitable attempt at envelopment.

Meanwhile the main enemy thrust down the ridge was growing in proportions. By 2200 the battalion commander estimated that the two understrength parachute companies and Company B (less one platoon) were opposed by at least two enemy battalions attacking in full force. Our artillery fire was growing in intensity as additional batteries were brought in but minimum range considerations prevented its full effectiveness in breaking up the oncoming formations which were launching repeated assaults against the small force of some 300 Marines who clung stubbornly to the ridge.

At 2230, the enemy launched a coordinated attack against the positions held by the parachutists on the left. The attack

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was preceded by a violent mortar barrage and the enemy advanced under cover of a smoke screen shouting "Gas Attack!" "Gas Attack!" in English in an effort to demoralize the defenders. The attack drove the parachutists from their positions and they fell back along the ridge exposing the left flank of Company B which now found itself ringed by the enemy on three sides. Captain Sweeney who held the position now had but sixty (60) men available for its defense.

The battalion commander decided to withdraw the remainder of Company B and reform his position in the vicinity of the battalion reserve line. Here the ridge is dominated by a commanding hill which afforded a strong position and a natural rallying point in the darkness. Company C which held the position was used as a defensive nucleus and additional elements withdrawing from the forward positions were reformed and assigned to the position. There was an unavoidable intermingling of units and some confusion but through the efforts of senior battalion officers the position was reestablished successfully.

Their reformation of lines was covered by Company C (Bailey) and by a standing barrage of 105mm which interdicted the approaches and assisted Major Bailey's men in breaking up repeated attacks. Major Bailey, wounded at Tulagi and wounded again on this occasion was later to lose his life on the Matanikao. On this night by his coolness, energy and great personal bravery he did much to hold our last position intact during the critical period of reorganization. The artillery was likewise highly effective. With its communications disrupted and operating under technically disadvantageous circumstances it pounded incessantly at every target and placed its protective curtain of steel at every threatened point. It was the most intensive concentration of the campaign and the 2000 rounds of ammunition expended did much to break up the successive enemy assaults.

By 0230 the battalion commander was confident that his position could be held although the attacks were continuing with unabated ferocity. Each was announced by a red rocket flare fixed to indicate the objective and direction of attack. Using this signal as a point of reference, our artillery combed the area and shortened its fire to cover the point of assault. When the enemy penetrated the barrage they would halt momentarily to illuminate our positions with calcium flares thrown by hand and then, break-

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ing into the traditional "Banzai" cheer, would storm up the slopes toward our positions. Our reply was an intense volume of automatic fire reserved for close range and delivered in the space of a few seconds as the enemy attempted to cross the last few yards of open ground in front of our positions.

Before sunrise it was obvious that the fresh enemy impulses were growing successively weaker. At daylight the attacks ceased altogether, being replaced by a large volume of sniper and light machine gun fire from all sides. Our attack aviation began support missions at daylight and by 0700 there remained only the desultory fire of individual snipers who had infiltrated during the night and now found themselves cut off.

The actions and conduct of those who participated in the defense of the ridge is deserving of the warmest commendation. The troops engaged were tired, sleepless and battle weary at the outset. Throughout the night they held their positions in the face of powerful attacks by overwhelming numbers of the enemy. Driven from one position they reorganized and clung tenaciously to another until daylight found the enemy again in full flight. To Colonel Edson, the battalion commander, is due the greatest of praise for the leadership, personal courage and intrepidity which inspired his exhausted men to remain faithful to their trust and to prevail in one of the most sanguinary encounters of the campaign.

The enemy force employed against the ridge undoubtedly exceeded 2000 men. More than 600 enemy dead were found on the battlefield and many more were killed in mopping up operations to follow. This takes no account of the wounded, most of whom died or were abandoned along the trails as the enemy fell back through the difficult terrain of the upper Lunga. Our losses were one (1) officer and thirty (30) men killed, five (5) officers and ninety-eight (98) men wounded and nine (9) missing or approximately twenty per cent of the troops actually engaged.

In addition to the fight for the ridge our forces were engaged in another sector during the night of September 13-14 when the enemy attempted to break through the position held by Third Battalion, First Marines (Mc Kelvey). This battalion held the extreme right of the right flank extension. In this area the Tenaru is no longer an obstacle and the position could be approached from the front or turned by a movement around the right flank

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which was entirely "in the air." The line occupied by the battalion was sited along the edge of the jungle and overlooked a wide flat plain affording an ideal field of fire. The position lacked depth of any sort but the main line of resistance had been thoroughly prepared for defense. It was covered by continuous bands of tactical and protective wire, the grass had been burned off the plain and the plan of fires was well coordinated.

At midnight the enemy launched an attack across the plain against the front of the extreme right flank company. It failed to penetrate, but the fire fight continued for several hours. In the morning it was apparent that the edge of the woods across the plain was held by a force of at least one battalion with some artillery. Tanks were employed against the position, at first with some success. However, the mistake was made of attempting repeated sorties along the same route. Enemy anti-tank weapons were soon put into position and a subsequent sortie was met with close range fire which destroyed three tanks. Thereafter the fighting in this sector resolved itself into a desultory fire fight across the plain which continued intermittently until 16 September when the enemy withdrew. Enemy losses here were estimated at 200.

There was also an encounter on the extreme left flank where the short flank extension of the Fifth Marines terminated on a ridge commanding the coastal road leading to Matanikau. This position was held by Third Battalion, Fifth Marines (Biebush). The attack came without warning on the late afternoon of the 14th and for a time it appeared that the hill would be carried, as there were only small forces in position at the point of attack. However prompt reinforcement and timely artillery support eventually drove the attackers down the slopes and into the jungle. The attack was not renewed although there was considerable anxiety during the night due to the lack of reserves to support this area or to prevent a movement around its exposed flank.

#### Enemy Conduct of Operations

From an examination of captured documents it appeared that the Japanese plan was to launch three simultaneous assaults at remote points in an attempt to disrupt our defenses. These attacks were to be supported by naval bombardment and strong air attacks. The plan failed through lack of coordination and timing. The naval bombardments were ineffective; fire was delivered indiscriminately and sometimes fell in areas occupied by

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their own troops. Determined air assaults were made, but the strongest of these, a dive bombing attack on Henderson field, was not delivered until sunset 14 September, too late to have had any effect on ground operations. The attack on the Third Battalion, Fifth Marines, was almost twenty-four hours late and was not a sustained effort.

The plan was likewise complicated and gave little consideration to the difficulties to be encountered in night attacks delivered over rugged jungle country. There appears to have been a failure to reconnoiter our positions to detect the weak spots and the numerous gaps which existed in our defenses. The pre-conceived scheme of maneuver was rigidly adhered to, despite the fact that it was obviously based on information of our defenses as they existed at the time of the Tenaru battle. In action subordinate commanders ignored opportunities to improvise maneuvers to fit the actual circumstances of terrain and defensive dispositions.

It is estimated that almost 6000 enemy were engaged in these operations. The original intention doubtless was to employ a much larger force, for the toll of losses incurred from our air attacks on troops in transit must have been extremely heavy. Losses of supplies at Tasimboko likewise may have seriously impaired the main effort.

In an operation of this character a force may approach a defensive system under the limitless cover of the jungle without fear of detection. The defender is constrained to so dispose his forces that he is strong nowhere and lacks adequate reserves. To this extent the attacker enjoys a great advantage, for he may concentrate in overwhelming numbers at any selected point. Consequently he does not necessarily require superior forces to achieve success. In these operations, however, the enemy grossly underestimated either our strength, our fighting qualities or both. It may be that his earlier successes against white troops in eastern theatres had induced a state of contempt for our capacity or willingness to fight. In any event he was thoroughly beaten at every point of contact and in the final analysis showed that he was utterly incapable, intellectually and morally, of meeting the requirements of modern warfare.

#### Subsequent Operations

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the effective radius of action of our aircraft until late afternoon. This confined our retaliatory action to a single bombing mission before nightfall except on clear moonlit nights when it was possible to continue attacks throughout the night. The heavy toll of enemy vessels damaged and destroyed in these attacks had the general effect of cutting down his naval superiority in the South Pacific and the local effect of reducing the strength of his landing forces with consequent detriment to their morale and effectiveness.

The fighter units were invariably successful in the unending series of encounters over Henderson Field. Losses of Five enemy aircraft to One of our own were the usual ratio. When shot down in combat a large proportion of our pilots was rescued, whereas enemy personnel were almost always killed or captured. The offensive spirit of the fighter pilots was magnificent and inspiring. Odds were never counted. For example, On August 30 only eight fighters were available on the island. From 1220 to 1400 they engaged in a continuous fight with a large force of Zeros. Eighteen Zeros were shot down, but our effective fighter strength was reduced from eight to four. While these four remaining fighters were being serviced a second formation of enemy planes attacked, sinking the Calhoun, a destroyer transport. The four fighters immediately took the air and gained altitude in time to engage a third enemy flight. In this second engagement eight enemy planes were shot down without further losses to ourselves. Annex includes a summary of aerial combats during the period.

The Army P-400 types were especially valuable in supporting ground activities although dive bombers were also employed on occasion. Both types were used with good effect in support of the Tasimboko raid in spite of poor air-ground communications. Thereafter steps were taken to improvise air liaison parties. These proved a distinct improvement but there remains a need for regularly organized air-ground communication teams within Infantry Regiments. At the battle of the ridge P-400s took the air at daylight on 14 September and drove the last remaining enemy forces from their positions along the ridge. Thereafter they engaged in a continuous series of independent operations against hostile landing craft, bivouacs, and troop formations.

#### Logistics

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The supply problem greatly improved during this period. In addition to small destroyer transports, it was found practicable to bring larger ships into the area as well. This was largely due to the high order of performance of our interception fighters which almost invariably were able to break up hostile bombing formations before the latter had opportunity for delivering a coordinated attack. Small reserves of ammunition, defensive materials, and rations were landed and it was evident that for the time being at least our line of communications could be maintained. At the end of the period full rations were restored for all troops except headquarters units. (Annex C Logistics).

#### Lessons and Conclusions - Phase IV

##### 1. General

1. A major landing operation such as the Guadalcanal - Tulagi attack will be followed by a period of minor operations for purposes of defense, mopping up, and seizure of small outlying bases. To accomplish these tasks successfully landing equipment must remain available to the landing force for tactical purposes. During the entire Guadalcanal operation the use of attached landing craft for tactical purposes was, of necessity, subordinated to their administrative employment in the unloading of supply vessels. Likewise the few APD's available were usually assigned to escort duty for which they were ill adapted. Three were lost while on such duty during the period covered by this report. These factors had an extremely adverse effect on the conduct of the entire operation. Only limited operations involving the use of small numbers of craft could be planned. In repeated instances it was necessary to cancel planned operations due to the unexpected arrival of supply vessels or non-availability of APD's. To execute the Tasimboko landing, for example, it was necessary to shuttle the raiding force from Lunga in two echelons a procedure which exposed the advance force to the danger of defeat in detail. Future operations should make provision for a force of landing craft and APD's to remain with the landing force at all times for purely tactical missions.

##### Organization and Training

2. (1) The 11th Marines (Artillery) on 21 August and again on 13 September showed great proficiency and technical skill in the use of its artillery in close support of defensive operations.

(2) Prior to the Solomons operation some doubt was en-

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tertained as to the practicability of employing the 105mm in jungle warfare in view of its lack of mobility. It is now considered that this weapon has a definite place in future operations in the Pacific. Since large scale operations will almost invariably center around the seizure or defense of installations on or near the sea ramp boats and amphibian tractors can be employed to move artillery. In this same connection it should also be noted that the coastal terrain of the Pacific islands often includes areas of flat ground permitting free movement of guns and normal prime movers. The superior effectiveness of this weapon and its desirable ballistic characteristics were clearly demonstrated on the night of 13 September. It is considered highly desirable that these advantages be retained by continuing to include this type of artillery in all large operations.

(3) Tanks were employed with some success on two occasions. An analysis of these actions indicates:

- (a) That the jungle is generally unfavorable for tank action.
- (b) That tanks in small numbers can operate effectively in areas occupied by coconut plantations.
- (c) That the tanks must operate at slow speed and with extremely close infantry support.
- (d) That wherever possible medium tanks should be employed due to the extreme vulnerability of the light models.

(4) During this period it was necessary to employ pioneers and engineers on infantry missions. The results clearly vindicated the Marine Corps policy of thorough training of such units in weapons and tactics.

(5) There appeared a distinct need for regularly organized air support parties to accompany ground forces for liaison and control purposes in connection with the use of supporting aircraft.

(6) The presence of a limited number of qualified interpreters to translate enemy documents and examine prisoners of war was of great value in ascertaining enemy intentions and in studying his habits of combat.

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### Equipment

3. (1) The absence of sufficient defensive materiel was a severe handicap throughout this period. None was landed initially and only small amounts were received in subsequent shipments of supplies. It is recommended that a higher landing priority be assigned to a small portion of such materiel. As a result of this experience the present landing operating procedure of this division prescribes that ten (10) per cent of such supplies shall be assigned landing priority "X" - Variable" (i.e. so embarked as to be accessible for landing on call at any time during the ship to shore movement).

(2) A proportion of the defensive wire carried by the division should be of the prepared concertina type. It will often be necessary to pass to the defensive on such short notice as to preclude erection of double apron fence prior to attack. Wired in defenses are highly desirable particularly in the event of night attack. This division contemplates carrying sixty (60) percent concertina in all future operations.

(3) Since it is obvious that the enemy will always resort to night attack there is an urgent need for night illumination material in defensive operations. This should take the form of parachute flares for illuminating beaches and a hand thrown flare for illuminating the immediate foreground of jungle positions.

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### Command

4. Before entering combat all officers who do not appear to possess the requisite command ability should be relieved of command. It is better to enter combat with limited shortage of officers than to be faced with the necessity of relieving the incapable in the presence of the enemy.

### Enemy

5. The enemy demonstrates a high state of training with respect to night operations; movement and control were excellent. However, he underestimates the disadvantages accruing to this type of attack particularly with respect to the effectiveness of the prearranged night fires of the defense.. To preserve direction he followed the conventional practice of moving dense columns of infantry along terrain lines leading to the objective. These were

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interdicted as a matter of course by the deep supporting fires of our artillery and mortars. In consequence severe losses were inflicted upon many enemy columns during the approach march.

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LIST OF ANNEXES FOR PHASE IV

- A Intelligence Annex
- B Medical Annex
- C Logistics
- D Communications Annex
- E Artillery Annex
- F Fifth Marines Annex
- G First Marines Annex
- H Aviation Activities on Guadalcanal
- I Extracts from Operations Daily Journal
- J Map and Overlays  
Enclosures:
  - One Copy Map #104
  - One Overlay Showing Movements  
1st Battalion, First Marines  
During Tenaru Battle, 21 August
  - One Overlay Showing Defensive  
Dispositions as of 13 September

NOTE: In many cases annexes are appended merely to present a fresh and more detailed point of view. Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed therein do not necessarily bear the approval of this headquarters.

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INTELLIGENCE  
PHASE IV  
(21 August to 18 September, 1942).

Summary of Intelligence Activities and Sources of Information.

Division C.P.: The D-2 Section, minus the photo-litho sub-section, operated throughout at the Division C.P., 58.8 - 116.6 (reference: D-2 map #101, 18 August 1942), save for the short period 9 to 15 September, when the C.P. was located at 60.6 - 114.7, in the jungle ridges South of the airfield. Personnel was as follows: Lt. Col. Buckley, D-2, Capt. Moran, Japanese interpreter, Lt. Clemens, British Solomon Islands Defense Force, British and native liaison, 2nd Lt. Kidde, Ass't D-2, 2nd Lt. Whitehead, Ass't D-2, and sixteen (16) enlisted, whose time was divided between C.P. duties and OP watches at D-2 OL and OR.

Summary of events: The phase was highlighted by the battles of the Tenaru, 21 August, and of Bloody Ridge, 13/14 September. Enemy casualties were estimated at 1000 in each engagement; total enemy casualties for this phase at 3000. By casualties are meant Japs definitely or probably destroyed and some 200 prisoners, for the most part Labor Battalion personnel.

Estimated enemy strength at the end of this phase was no more than one thousand (1000), poorly organized, in the Western sector, upwards of 2000, better organized and equipped, and increasing, in the Western sector. Both attacks were organized and directed from the Eastern sector, in which enemy troops had been landed, mainly in the vicinity of Tasimboko and from DDs, in the period 18 August to 4 September. Starting 5 September, the enemy started to build up his strength in the Western sector, by means not only of the nightly landings from fast cruisers and destroyers but of landing boats staged all the way from Shortland and jumping off first from San Jorge Island at the Southeast end of Ysabel, later from New Georgia via the Russells. Troops landed between Visale and Marovovo at the Northwestern end.

The battle of the Tenaru was the Division's first contact with the Japanese Army. The attacking group of approximately one battalion reinforced, virtually annihilated save for a small rear echelon left behind at Taivu, was a specially trained force of troops originally destined for amphibious operations at Midway and commanded by a Colonel Ichiki. The troops were mostly without combat experience but with one and a half years' service and under experienced officers, and were very well equipped with small arms,

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ANNEX A (CONT)

automatic weapons, grenades, mortars, flame-throwers, demolitions and battalion guns. As a spearhead for a larger body of troops to follow, they attacked recklessly, evidently underestimating our strength and organization, particularly when they met no opposition approaching along the coast and found the Beach Red area abandoned. The larger body, which followed was a brigade of some 2500 men under the command of Major General Kawaguchi, slated for the attack on 13 September. It started moving West on 2 September. The operation of the 1st Raider Bn. against Tasimboko on 8 September hit this force in the rear, inflicted some casualties, and destroyed great quantities of supplies, showing the size of the units landed and confirming the nature of their equipment, including artillery. Their attack was to be twofold, from the South and East, while diversionary tactics were employed by troops to the West, but this attack was poorly coordinated, and the main effort was sustained in the ridges South of the airfield.

In the Bloody Ridge area about 600 dead were estimated on personal reconnaissance and the remainder of the group which attacked here endeavored under harshest circumstance to make its way West after defeat. Future enemy attacks in force were to be directed from the West.

This was also the heroic phase of our aviation while we were daily bombed by superior numbers but inflicted mounting losses on the enemy, at the same time as first bombing and strafing missions were carried out against the enemy's ground forces and landing groups, and daily searches covering the sea approaches usually spotted enemy shipping on the way, often permitting strikes which harassed and sometimes stopped their progress. However it was evident at the end of the phase that our airforce, such as it was, could not prevent the enemy from landing reinforcements and supplies on Guadalcanal, under cover of darkness and unfavorable weather conditions, and thus massing for a larger and more decisive contest.

D-2 Activities: Aside from the man-hours expended in the digging and construction of air raid shelters, in lugging gear and materials from C.P. to C.P. and back, in sume the labor and strain incident to living, D-2 maintained throughout 24 hour watches at the C.P. and its OPs. Every available person save for the officer and enlisted man on watch, remained on guard all night at the C.P. from dusk to dawn on the 13th and 14th of September. Native police and refugees augmented our number. Visitors from the staff and lower units, messengers with captured material, and occasional misdirected Japs came and went from the D-2 tent day and night. Five telephones: Texas, DSIO, OL, OR and R-2 11, rang constantly,

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and information received and noted was regularly consolidated in the Journal, our sole permanent record. Four situation maps were kept up; an overlay of map #101 of the Lunga Area, with all Division units marked thereon, paying particular attention to C.P.s., and OPs; a map #102 of Guadalcanal showing known enemy concentrations and activity from day to day; another map #102 maintained by Lt. Clemens showing the location from day to day of our native police and scouts; and an H.O. chart #2896 of the Solomons, showing the Coast Watcher system, air searches, and the position of enemy ships with course, speed and time, with tables of main distances and times by air and sea at mean speeds.

Lack of means and leisure dispensed with any worksheet, and no bulletins or reports were issued, though the intelligence officer remained at the disposal of the staff for regular oral estimates and reports and information was properly relayed to lower units, until a first periodic account of enemy activity in the Solomons outside of Guadalcanal was compiled, covering the period from 21 August to 12 September. With carbon copies made by typewriter, the distribution was CG, C of Staff, D-3, OTF62 and File. Bi-monthly periodic reports with a larger distribution were thenceforward to be compiled and multistamped, but a first multistamped estimate of the enemy situation on Guadalcanal was only made up on 24 September.

The photolitho unit was called upon to produce with lithographic and photographic paper at a minimum, and demand at a maximum. First came Annex Affirm to Map #101 continuing Easwards to Koli Point, then the 28 sheet reproduction of the aerial mosaic received on 14 August. And D-2 map #103, North Coast Guadalcanal from 10 miles West to 6 miles East of Taivu Point, 9 September, was prepared against the arrival of the 7th Marines who were first of all to land down East. This 8 sheet job was not used, though it used up all our paper, but came in very handy at the beginning of November.

Sources of information: Sources of information established in Phase III were now exploited to the full, the principal additional source being our own aviation, with the patrols and searches it established, and reports of strikes and contact, usually supplemented by Coastwatcher observations. But to take the sources one by one, covering in order the three circles defined in the previous phase:- In the first circle, regiments and battalions continued to supply most of the information arising from patrols and contacts, though the flow was not as complete or as regular as it might have been. OP reports came in more frequently, but suffered from illusions: in this the Division OPs again proved their

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## ANNEX A (CONT)

value when it came to clear and accurate reporting, and checking on the fantastic. In the second circle, embracing the island as a whole, aerial reconnaissance and observation was supplemented by the reports of Coastwatcher stations VQJ8 and VQJ10, of native police and scouts, the interviewing of prisoners and the translation of captured documents. The two Coastwatchers with their native assistance could not hope to cover enemy activity in its entirety, but they managed to give us at least half the information we wanted concerning numbers, movement and disposition, while their own situation was imperilled by constant Japanese reinforcement and extension, interfering with the free movement of scouts from their stations of Lunga and vice versa.

The scouts who reached the Lunga area were interviewed by Lt. Clemens, who would draw up and submit in writing their reports, duly filed and accessible as were the radio messages entered into the Journal. Vouza, soon to organize his own raiders, reported both to us and to VQJ8. Refugees such as the missionary Stibbard from Marovovo told of their routes to safety and their observations on the way. We knew pretty well where the enemy were after the Tenaru, their direction, their approximate numbers and certain details of their armament. From prisoners and documents we acquired a supplementary picture of the enemy's units, their modes of access and their activities on the island. The only trouble with this wealth of information was that it concerned largely past events and did not forecast the future except by implication. But Capt. Moran must again be commended for his success in eliciting from individual prisoners such complete accounts of their background, service, experience and knowledge.

The third circle, covering the entire island chain from San Cristobal to Bougainville, was of course the province of Coastwatcher stations ZGJ3, ZGJ (Malaita), Unattached K (Ysabel), ZGJ5 (New Georgia), STO (Buin) and JER (Buka). Here too aviation furnished warnings and observations, but of a more immediate nature. They could not cover enemy activity from day to day in the same way as an observer stationed on the ground. The nearer Coastwatchers rendered the further invaluable service of locating and rescuing aviators from Henderson Field shot or forced down, informing us forthwith of their safety and transmitting their reports and requests. They served too, particularly ZGJ5 and JER, as warners of approaching air raids. If San Cristobal and Malaita remained by and large outside the enemy's sphere, they might not necessarily continue so, and reports of occasional planes and submarines and observations of shipping were very welcome, as was our knowledge of these established intelligence sources. On New Georgia, we were not only well posted on air and sea traffic, but

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ANNEX A (CONT)

the enemy's shore establishment and seaplane anchorage on Gizo was covered by native patrols, who told not only of enemy activity, numbers, supplies, equipment, installations and exact dispositions, but also reported on the exact damage caused by our strikes. This contributed to our success in forcing the evacuation of Gizo on 19 September, though the Japs then started developing their outpost at Rekata Bay for the same purpose. But again on Ysabel, ZGJ6 kept us regularly posted concerning activity there. In the same way, the increase of shipping in the Faisi-Buin area was most accurately noted by STO and passed on to us, the arrivals and departures of cruisers, DDs and freighter-transports, and the beginnings of construction ashore, which started at Kihili on 7 September, and blossomed into the airdrome, construction of which was definitely established 21 September, use of which 8 October. Buka drome, advanced base for fighter planes, was observed by JER, as were the results of bombing raids impairing its operation, and the passage of ships, for servicing and staging rather than operational purposes. To sum up, the enemy showed their intention in this phase of maintaining a reconnaissance seaplane base in the central Solomons, and advanced fighter fields in the Northwestern Solomons, to escort bombers from more distant bases, and to provide cover and protection for shipping in the operational area. The principal naval base was Shortland, increasing throughout the phase in importance as more and more was committed to winning back the positions lost in the Southeastern Solomons. On September 17, 28 ships could be counted from Buin, including at least 4 cruisers and 16 DDs at the origin of the Cactus express.

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ANNEX B

MEDICAL  
Phase IV

The fourth phase of the Guadalcanal operation which extended from August 21 to September 18, 1942 was initiated by the report of a sentry's rifle, near the mouth of the Tenaru River. About midnight August 20, 1942 an unanswered challenge by this sentry was the beginning of the Tenaru engagement which resulted in the complete extermination of approximately one thousand enemy troops within a period of sixteen hours. During this phase the First Marine Division was to engage in both offensive and defensive operations. It was to feel the effects of disease, solar radiations, and temperature changes peculiar to the tropics, as a factor in the creation of non-effectives in combat.

Two weeks after the initial landing a moderate amount of gastro-enteritis made its appearance. Due to lack of laboratory facilities for proper bacteriological study the exact bacteriology is not known. It reacted to treatment rather promptly and the number of cases decreased materially in about three weeks. There was, however, one death in the Division attributed to this cause. It was important, not because of the seriousness of the individual cases, many of which were mild, but because of the number of non-effectives created and the resulting debility as a contributing factor in lowered resistance to subsequent diseases. It is interesting to note that with improvement of general camp sanitation, the gastro-enteritis decreased to an insignificant figure. Five cases with amoeba as a causative organism were found later and evacuated at once. Persistent cases were evacuated and two of these were reported by dispatch as being Flexner-Strong type of bacillary dysentery.

At about the same time there were a moderate number of cases of Catarrhal Fever and a Dengue-like fever made its appearance in the area. These reacted to symptomatic treatment and hospitalization with bed rest. Catarrhal Fever was soon to disappear entirely as a diagnosis and the Dengue-like fever did not extend with its usual rapidity. Although constantly on the watch for malaria, this disease did not appear clinically until the third week in August, 1942, two weeks after the landing on Red Beach. During that week four cases were admitted to the hospitals. From that point malaria became an ever increasing problem, forty-eight cases being in hospitals by the end of the second week in September.

Suppressive treatment for malaria in the form of Atabrine, grains one and one-half twice a day, twice weekly, was begun by order dated September 10, 1942. Although instructions for its

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wound and hospitalization was rarely over one or two hours. Blood plasma, however, was given in the forward aid stations and hospital boats when indicated.

In the Field Hospitals (Division Field Hospital and tent hospitals) all fractures were resplinted, compound fractures were reduced, debrided in most cases ("E" Medical Company being the exception) and redressed with Sulfanilamide powder. All penetrating abdominal wounds were explored and perforations closed, with sulfanilamide locally in the peritoneal cavity. Chest wounds were not explored or sutured. Head wounds were interferred with only when a decompression was necessary or debridement indicated. General principles of surgery applied to all other cases, suture of wounds, muscles and tendons, was done as indicated in the judgement of the attending medical officer..

Casualties the result of enemy action were not the only concern of the Division Hospitals. Casualties from disease were more constant and numerous. With the subsidence of gastro-enteritis, Catarrhal Fever, and Dengue, malaria became the major problem. Before the end of this phase the Division was to have one death from cerebral malaria and all hospitals developed special wards and personnel for its proper diagnosis and treatment.

Early in this phase the Fifth Regiment Headquarters medical section, consisting of the medical officer and seven corpsmen, had developed a convalescent hospital which absorbed the overflow from "A" Company, First Medical Battalion and ran an average of forty-five beds with a maximum at one time of one hundred and five patients. This continued to function throughout the operation and was finally taken over by "A" and "C" Companies on November 4, 1942, when the regiment moved to a new area.

Fungus infection of the feet, groin, and inter-gluteal fold assumed minor importance. Lack of proper personal hygiene and loss of clothing contributed to this condition. Especially was the lack of socks, both in quantity and in quality, important in the incidence, progress, and treatment of this disease. Socks should have a priority value high on the scale of replacements in clothing.

It became the policy of the Division that any man who would no be fit for duty in ten days to two weeks, should be evacuated from the island. This was done by sea and air. The Division Surgeon arranged this evacuation through the senior aviation surgeon for air evacuations and Division transport officer for sea evacuations. Up to the end of this phase sea evacuation took by

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ANNEX B (CONT)

far the larger number of evacuees to naval or shore hospitals. The first transport plane, which would accomodate eighteen cases on stretchers or thirty-six sitting cases, arrived September 3, 1942. A few isolated cases had been evacuated by air previous to that date in smaller combat planes. This transport was met on the field by ambulances, patients placed aboard, and was ready to leave in fifteen minutes. This was repeated with increasing frequency and numbers of transports until by September 18, 1942, one hundred and forty-seven (147) patients had been evacuated by air. During this time seven hundred and one (701) officers and men were evacuated by sea.

Three important facts relative to the general health of the command became apparent during this phase. They were first, suppressive treatment for malaria, difficult under the best conditions, cannot be carried out in combat conditions without the fullest cooperation of every line officer. Especially is this true of the platoon leaders who are in close contact with the troops. Second is the absolute lack of field sanitation in combat, empty cans, food particles, and excreta were not properly disposed of at once. This does not concern the advancing party but is intensely important to the future occupying forces. Third is the need of adequate water supply for the front lines. The terrific loss of water by spillage, and time loss in filling cans from a water cart with only one outlet and that two inches in diameter, is grossly inefficient, when cans or canteens with small openings are being filled. One water cart of three hundred gallons capacity can be filled at the filtration-chlorination plant in ten minutes but it takes over three hours to empty that water cart in the field. Each water cart should be fitted with at least two medium spigots for filling cans and five or six small spigots on each side to be used in filling canteens.

The one factor which limits the emergency expansion of field or tent hospitals such as were used in this operation is not lack of equipment, personnel, or drugs. Our hospitals did expand in a few hours from seventy-two to four hundred patients upon certain occasions. The factor which limits their size is the number and size of proper underground shelters from air and naval bombardment. Without heavy equipment and very careful selected areas, shelters must be dug by hand (time consuming) and are below water level, especially during the rainy season. During this and earlier phases, these shelters were constructed by hand and without heavy engineering equipment. Although hospital areas enjoyed no immunity from hits in their areas, it was never considered necessary to construct underground operating rooms and all surgery was done above ground. Surgical procedures were carried out during air raids and later during naval bombardments.

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ANNEX B (CONT)

This phase in the Tulagi sector was largely one of withdrawal of troops. The large number required in the initial action were being transferred to more active areas or removed entirely out of the zone of action. Patrolling of nearby islands continued and casualties did result. These were treated in their local field hospital and evacuated by sea plane or ship. The Dengue-like fever was more a factor on Tulagi than it was on Guadalcanal, but never reached serious proportions. One battalion transferred to Guadalcanal from Tulagi on August 21, 1942 arrived free from any intestinal infection, and after this infection had subsided markedly on Guadalcanal. Two weeks later, however, this battalion was suffering from approximately the same percentage of cases as had been previously present in the Division two weeks after landing on Guadalcanal. The number, frequency, and duration of these cases followed the same pattern noted earlier in the Division.

During late August, 1942, the water situation became acute in spite of reduced numbers, and water was brought from Florida Island in tank lighters.

Communications and transportation were so well established by the end of this phase that for all practical purposes the Tulagi area was considered, from a medical point of view, exactly as any regiment or supporting group on the island. During this period and thereafter there were frequent contacts between Tulagi and Guadalcanal by sea and air. Supplies requisitioned by the medical section in that area were filled by the Division Medical Supply Section and delivered by sea or amphibian plane.

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ANNEX B (6)

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ANNEX C

LOGISTICS  
PHASE IV

ENGINEER

On the morning of 21 August, the Engineer Battalion was directed to assign one company to the 2nd Battalion, First Marines to assist in defensive work in connection with operations against the enemy on the TENARU RIVER at that time. "C" Company reported for this duty and carried out construction of an anti-tank obstacle and mine field across the sandspit at the mouth of the TENARU, laying of protective and tactical wire, and digging in of emplacements, part of this work being done under sniper fire. "C" Company completed this duty and returned to the Battalion on 22 August. The same date, the 2nd Platoon of "A" Company, returned to from ETULAGI, having completed its duty with the 2nd Battalion, Fifth Marines.

On 22 August, as a security measure, an outpost of one squad of Engineers was established South of the Battalion bivouac near the place which later became known as RAIDER'S RIDGE.

A makeshift system of night lighting, to outline the runway on the airfield for emergency night landing, was rigged from captured enemy equipment, no other gear being available. During most of this period, the Engineers continued to carry out maintenance and repair of the airfield, until this duty was taken over by the Sixth Naval Construction Battalion about the middle of September.

During this period several small bridge jobs were accomplished, none, however, being of a major nature, and none requiring any great degree of speed in construction. At no time while the division was on the island was there anything approaching an adequate supply of Engineer materials, particularly lumber, to meet constant demands. A great deal in the nature of field expedients was necessary to carry out the simplest of jobs. At this time, however, there still remained a meagre supply of what might be classed as bridging timber, and foreseeing possible future demands, this was rationed to make it go as far as possible. As time went on, it gradually became apparent that the toughest part of any Engineer assignment was the procurement of the necessary materials, particularly in the case of bridges. Salvage crews soon became so proficient that they could spot a piece of two inch lumber as far as they could see it. Frequently the Battalion Commander had to call on the Division staff for moral support when someone's self-styled private lumber pile was raided by "those cussed Engineers". Needless to say, this support was always forthcoming.

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ANNEX C (1)

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About 30 August, work was begun on blast shelters for planes and fuel on the airfield, but this job was never completed in its entirety because of repeated interruptions for other higher priority work. Work was begun and continued for sometime on shelters for radio equipment, and for personnel and equipment in Division Headquarters. Water supply was continued and averaged about 60,000 gallons daily.

About 1 September, reconnaissance for a new access road from the main LUNGA POINT Beach Road South along the West side of the LUNGA RIVER, was begun and about the same time work was begun on a new Division C.P. Southeast of the airfield (Map #104--8140-1990).

About 6 September, construction was begun on the new access road southwest of the LUNGA RIVER (78502010-78602006). It involved handcutting through about 600 yards of thick jungle. Luckily, no earth-moving was necessary, for by careful reconnaissance, the route was located along a fairly level stretch with reasonable good natural drainage. After the cutting was completed, as much rough gravel as hauling facilities would allow, was hauled from the LUNGA RIVER and dumped on the road before any traffic passed over. One point may well be mentioned here; in roads through thick jungle, it is a definite advantage to leave undisturbed as much as possible the mass of intertwined vegetation roots just under the surface, for these seem to do a great toward preventing the breaking up of the road, particularly in wet weather.

On 13 September the Engineer Battalion received word to stand-by as Division Reserve and that night, "A" and "C" Companies and one platoon of H&S Company moved out of bivouac into the old positions on the airfield to defend against possible parachute attack. This move was accomplished in the dark during a naval shelling, but each man knew from previous experience just which foxhole he occupied and little difficulty was encountered in occupying positions as ordered. The attack did not develop and companies returned to the Battalion area the following morning to standby as Division Reserve. At 1500, "D" Company was ordered to report to the Commanding Officer, Raider Battalion, to reinforce the line held by that organization. This left a gap in the security line held by the Engineer Battalion; this gap was occupied by the reserve platoon from "C" Company which held that portion of the line adjacent to "D" Company which held that portion of the line adjacent to "D" Company's old position. This line extended roughly from the Division C.P. Hill North to the position of H&S Battery, 5th Battalion, 11th Marines. At about 2000 "A" Company, whose bivouac was in somewhat of a support position behind Div-

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ANNEX C (CONT)

ision C.P. Hill, was moved up into position around the hills, their mission being the security of the Division Command Post. This left the Battalion bivouac area defended by two Companies (H&S and "C") instead of four as originally planned. That night the enemy attacked from the Southwest and the Battle of Raiders' Ridge developed. That night at about 0100 it was known that snipers had infiltrated through the lines and at 0530, 14 September, outposts of the thin line held by "C" Company were attacked by what was apparently a patrol of about 30 men. Two machine gun positions on the left flank were neutralized and shortly thereafter, H&S Company was moved forward in an attempt to prevent further penetration to the artillery positions in the rear, and to cover the removal of the wounded. Later in the morning, "D" Company rejoined the Battalion, and a patrol was pushed forward about 800 yards, but the enemy had apparently withdrawn and no further contact was made. Engineer casualties during the morning were 14 wounded and 4 killed. Ten enemy dead were buried in the area. "A" Company, on the Division C.P. Hill had lost two men, one killed. The following day, two snipers were killed in the area, and a combat patrol from "D" Company went out to the East but no contact was made. The Battalion remained in its status as Division Reserve until 20 September. On 19 September, "B" Company, which had been on detached duty with the Seventh Marines, rejoined the Battalion.

PIONEERS

The first AK to arrive after the landing had been made arrived on 23 August, and Company "B", Pioneers, operated the beach. A working party of 900 men was provided by other organizations. All available trucks were furnished (about 90) as well as all boats the Naval Operating Base, Kukum, had on hand. This set-up was revised to later unloading until the following general organization was developed. One Pioneer Company handled the beach, another manned the boats and the third worked the holds of the ship. In addition a working party of 700 men, all available trucks--this varied, but averaged about 60-- and all TR's and TL's which averaged 12 and 8 respectively, were provided.

Working parties coming from front lines were frequently poorly fed in the morning and their noon meal and drinking water was often inadequate, so the Pioneers assumed responsibilities for feeding and watering working parties. After moving to its beach area, the Pioneers dug an 18 foot well and placed a portable water purification unit in operation. Water containers were made by boiling out gasoline drums, removing heads and welding three to-

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## ANNEX C (CONT)

gether. Spigots were placed at each end and one such container was set up at each unloading point. These were kept filled by means of a 300 gallon water trailer and a Jaeger pump. The Quartermaster made a direct issue of the necessary food components to make up a thick stew, and this was prepared in the Battalion Headquarters Company galley. This stew, with fruit, bread and coffee, was carried to each unloading point in vacuum food containers and served to small groups at a time. In this manner, the work of unloading could proceed continuously.

### SUPPLY

Supply activities during this phase were chiefly concerned with:

- (a) Replenishment (see Pioneer report).
- (b) Expenditure of ammunition.
- (c) Dispersal of aviation gasoline.
- (d) Dispersal of aviation bombs.
- (e) Measures to protect supplies.
- (f) Roads and water supply (see Engineers and Pioneer report).

### REPLENISHMENT

The first ships to arrive after the initial landing were the APD's CALHOUN, GREGORY, and LITTLE, with 120 tons of rations, representing 3½ days' supply. Thereafter, ships arrived at irregular intervals with all categories of supplies, but were rarely unloaded completely, because of interference by enemy air, surface and under sea attack. The calendar of ships' arrivals for this phase follows:

August 21 - Calhoun, Gregory, Little.  
22 - Alhena, Fomalhaut  
29 - Burrows, Kopara  
31 - Betelgeuse  
September 1 - 3 YP's  
2 - Fomalhaut  
7 - Bellatrix, Fuller

A schedule of ship arrivals and departures, with an account of cargo landed, is in Appendix 3.

### AMMUNITION

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## ANNEX C (CONT)

During this phase all ammunition was in the hands of organizations - no Division reserve had been established. An inventory was taken and adjustments were made among the organizations to correct the hasty allocations made in transit from Red Beach. These adjustments were found to be quite small.

In appendix "l" is an analysis of ammunition expenditure by the Division in the principal engagements beginning with the first battle of Matanikau, August 19, 1942. These figures are by no means precise, but represent the best approximation possible under the conditions that prevailed:

- (a) Jungle warfare, at night.
- (b) Frequent transfers of battalions.
- (c) Enemy shells and bombs which burned or buried an unknown quantity.

### DISPERSAL OF AVIATION AMMUNITION

During this phase, the first aircraft bombs arrived, with other aviation material. Aviation personnel were insufficient to handle all their supplies, so the ordnance platoon was assigned the duty of dispersing this ammunition until such time as Navy personnel could handle it. Two areas were selected adjacent to the airfield - one under cover of coconuts, the other in a series of open draws - to spread the risk of loss anticipated from bombing attack. No one could be found who knew the minimum distance that should be provided between bombs to prevent sympathetic detonation of the entire magazine. A minimum distance of 10 yards was arbitrarily set. No more than 1 - 1000 pound bomb, 2 - 500 pound bombs, 3 - 300 pound bombs, or 5 - 100 pound bombs were placed in any dump. Later, it was found that this distance was sufficient for unarmed bombs, as several near-misses ruptured bomb cases and burned the explosive, but no more than one dump was destroyed by any one near-miss. Bombs were laid in ditches where possible, but many lay on flat surfaces, covered by a few wisps of grass. Labor was not available to dug them in. The losses sustained from enemy action was amazingly small.

### DISPERSAL OF AVIATION GASOLINE

The same conditions prevailed with aviation gasoline as applied to bombs and the same organization directed its dispersal. However, a minimum distance of 30 yards was fixed between dumps, with not over 12 drums in each. Sites were selected in dry lagoons, ditches, and gravel bars, to secure as much defilade as possible, and in case of gravel bars, to provide instant leaking away of gas if a dump were hit, to avoid spreading fire by gasoline running on the surface to adjacent dumps. Drums were habitually laid flat to reduce silhouette, as a result of early experience

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## ANNEX C (CONT)

which showed that losses of drums on end were at least twice those laid flat, other conditions being the same.

### MEASURES TAKEN TO PROTECT SUPPLIES

#### RATIONS

The Division Quartermaster was faced with the problem of a very restricted area for dispersal of rations, inadequate shelter for perishables, and no blast protection. As noted before 20 days' rations were issued to organizations, to effect dispersal. The Division reserve was disposed as follows: Perishables were stored in storage tents, while canned foods were stacked according to types and kinds. The only shelter was that afforded by coconut trees, which afforded concealment from high level observation, while the trees protected the stores to some extent by detonating shells coming from the sea. There was no protection from bombing, other than the site being removed from more obvious installations - radio, powerhouses and airfield. It was thought, and rightly, as experience proved, that no loss from fire was likely, in as much as most rations were in tin and, if hit by shell, or bomb, the contents would automatically quench any fire that might be started. Losses from enemy action were extremely small.

#### AMMUNITION

At first, organizations were preoccupied with efforts to conceal, rather than to protect, their ammunition reserves. As a result, ammunition was stacked about coconut trees, with high silhouette, and covered with palm fronds. In late August, however, the enemy spread his bomb pattern to include the coconut grove adjacent to the airfields and exposed ammunition suffered some loss. The area was quite dry at the time and fire spread among the dry fronds to other dumps and increased the loss. The dumps of the 1st Marines, and aviation were principally affected. A Division order was issued directing an immediate start on digging-in ammunition level with ground surface and the burning of coconut fronds that littered the ground. Work was immediately started to accomplish this, but several weeks were required to complete it.

#### LIQUID FUELS

It was necessary to bury liquid fuels for the same reasons stated above for ammunition. However, no effort was made to protect Jap crude oil, as its usefulness was comparatively small. However, Jap kerosene, and gasoline, as well as our own, were gradually dug in. In this instance, however, a compromise was made in the depth of burying, to save time. Drums were placed in dumps of 6, half buried. This practice enabled the stores to be given protection much more rapidly and experience showed that the half-silhouette was justified by the greatly reduced losses from bombing.

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Aviation gasoline was not dug in. The quantity was too great and reliance was placed on defilade and wide dispersion to cut losses.

FIRE FIGHTING

Two Jap fire trucks were repaired by the First Marines and a fire brigade organized by Captain Cogswell, their quartermaster. They quickly extinguished the first fire in their ammunition dump. However, on September 2, a heavy bombing raid set fire to an SBD parked at the edge of the coconut grove. The bomb could not be removed. Consequently the bomb exploded and cast burning gas in all directions. 90mm shell dumps were just inside the woods lining the field. One was ignited and the resulting explosions prevented effective fire fighting and the conflagration spread. For a time it seemed that all this ammunition and nearby stores would be lost. The fire brigade courageously fought the fire and eventually brought it under control, although Captain Cogswell and several of his men were wounded. No water supply was available at the time other than the Lunga River, consequently the fire got out of control while the truck made its run to the river for refilling. Immediately thereafter, water tanks from plantation houses were repaired and spotted in the ammunition and ration dumps for a reserve supply. However, this proved to be the most serious fire loss sustained - subsequent losses were in the Division dumps as a result of naval shelling, at night. These losses were negligible, as this ammunition had been buried by that time.

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ANNEX D

COMMUNICATIONS  
PHASE IV

Wire communication facilities were improved and expanded during this phase. Operation of tactical radio nets was reduced to a minimum due to necessity of conserving limited dry battery supplies. All types of expendable signal supplies became critical and were classed as controlled items with issues controlled directly by the Division Signal Officer. Only limited supplies were received from external sources. All units had been supplied with 30 day replenishment allowances prior to departure for the operation and it was these supplies that prevented collapse of the communication system. Only small amounts of the 60 day replenishment supplies carried by the Signal Company Supply and Repair Section were landed prior to departure of the ships, and many of the supplies not landed were never seen again. Reinforcing units arriving at CACTUS were almost invariably short of signal equipment and the division had to share its limited supplies and equipment with these units.

Recommendations.

1. Automatic supply of Signal Equipment to combat area based on replenishment percentages given in TBA. Any item can easily be stopped if it would result in an excess.

2. Provision made for supply to all units which arrive in a given area.

082/271

Headquarters, First Marine Division  
Fleet Marine Force  
C/o Postmaster, San Francisco, Calif.

8 October 1942.

From: The Commanding General.  
To : The Commander South Pacific Area and South Pacific Force.

Subject: Japanese Radar Captured at Guadalcanal.

Reference: (a) ComSoPac Secret dispatch 160725 Aug to CinePac info ComAirSoPac.  
(b) CG CACTUS Secret dispatch 251015 Aug to ComSoPac.

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ANNEX D (1)

~~SECRET~~ ANNEX D (CONT)

- (c) ComSoPac Secret dispatch 261800 Aug to CG 1st MarDiv.
- (d) ComSoPacArea & SoPacFor ltr S67 Ser No 0050d to CG 1st MarDiv, 17 Sep 42.
- (e) CG 1st MarDiv Secret dispatch 222338 Sep to ComSoPac.
- (f) CG 1st MarDiv Secret dispatch 290352 Sep to ComSoPac Info Opnav.
- (g) CG 1st MarDiv Secret dispatch 030631 to ComSoPac, Info Opnav.

Enclosures: (OMITTED)

1. In compliance with reference (c) the subject equipment was loaded on the USS BETELGEUSE on 25 September 1942 for shipment on Memorandum invoice to the Naval Research Laboratory. As noted in reference (e) the aerial systems and one radar were destroyed during a bombing attack. Enclosure (A), taken before destruction, shows the radar aerial system. The Division has no plans of the radar or its installation for forwarding. Japanese Radar equipment captured at Tulagi was also shipped as reported in reference (g).

2. The two radars found on CACTUS were located on a ridge in the vicinity of the airfield. Each radar was installed in a shelter as shown by Enclosure (A). The shelters were mounted on a base permitting rotation through 360 degrees and were separated a distance of approximately 175 yards. Rotation could be controlled manually or by electric driven motors. High voltage power cables buried about 1½ foot underground were run from a central general use power plant located about 1000 yards away, with step-down transformers at a terminal station situated midway between the radars. The power plant was not in operation. Telephone service connected to the central Japanese telephone exchange through buried telephone cable was available in each radar station.

3. In reply to reference (a) certain information was furnished in reference (b) after a Japanese semi-portable power plant was found and placed in operation to permit testing the Radar equipment. This power plant broke down after a short period of operation and attempts to obtain further information and to operate the radars had to be suspended.

4. The information requested in para. 1 (a), (c) and (g) can be determined by an examination of the equipment and enclosures A and B. The radar was not capable of being ship-based, installation was clearly visible from the air, horizontal polarization was used, and the antenna was vertical.

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ANNEX D (CONT)

5. No attempt was made by the Japanese to destroy or damage the radar installations. Tubes and spare parts were available. It is not believed that the radars had been placed in operation except possibly for testing purposes.

6. Enclosures C1 to C7 are forwarded to show types of Japanese fixed station radio equipment and rectifier units which were captured.

C1 is a transmitter with approximately 2000 watts input and frequency range of 4000 to 17000 kcs. It has a plate voltage switch that permits applying potential successively to the oscillator stage, doubler stage, 1st IPA stage and final PA stage during tuning of the transmitter. Output is CW only.

C2 is a transmitter with approximately 600 watts input and frequency range of 4000 to 17000 kcs. Output is CW or voice. The small unit to the left is the modulator.

C3 is the power supply unit for C2.

C4 and C5 are views of typical receivers.

C6 and C7 are rectifier units for battery charging equipment.

7. The equipment shown in enclosures C1 to C7 was placed in operation by the utilization of parts from similar equipments made unserviceable due to various types of gunfire and through the technical skill, ability and efforts under trying circumstances of Master Technical Sergeant Felix L. Ferranto, U. S. Marine Corps. The transmitters are now in use pending the installation of standard Navy equipment. The receivers were destroyed during a bombing attack.

8. The Japanese radio transmitting and receiving stations were separated a distance of approximately 2000 yards. They were connected by a buried control cable with relays and patch cord connections at each terminal to permit keying of any transmitter from any receiving position. Power for both installations was to be obtained from the central power plant previously mentioned. The installations made provided for six separate radio circuits and indicated considerable detailed planning. No exceptional features of design or construction have been noted. Receiving and transmitting antenna systems were suspended from guyed creosoted poles so that the flat top of the system cleared the coconut groves in which both stations were situated.

A. A. VANDEGRIFT

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682/271

ANNEX D (CONT)

Headquarters, First Marine Division  
Fleet Marine Force  
C/o Postmaster, San Francisco, Calif.

8 December 1942.

From: The Commanding General.  
To : Commander Amphibious Force South Pacific.  
Via : The Commanding General, 1st Marine Amphibious Corps.  
Subject: Aircraft Communications in Amphibious Operations.  
Reference: (a) ComAmphForSoPac Secret ltr. A6-2 over 00405 to  
CG 1st MarDiv, 19 Nov 42.  
(b) 1st MarDiv Simplified Air Ground Panel Code (2  
copies enclosed).  
(c) 1st MarDiv Sig Opn Instrs (2 copies enclosed).  
(d) CSP 1536  
(e) CSP 1527(A) and 1528(A).  
Enclosure: (A) Two copies reference (b).  
(B) Two copies reference (c).

1. In reply to paragraph 4 of reference (a) the following report is submitted relative to air-ground communications:

(a)(1) At the present time the normal radio frequency prescribed for direct support air-ground communication is 3785 kcs and for artillery spotting communication is 7010 kcs. For special operations involving the use of direct support aircraft special provisions have been made in the Signal Annex of the Operation Order for frequencies and calls.

(2) Radio communication with supporting aircraft has not been reliable due to limitations of available equipment and lack of adequate prior air-ground training on the part of all concerned. Suitable frequency assignments present no appreciable problem provided naval aircraft has the necessary coils for operation in the various frequency bands. Initially such coils were not available to naval aircraft operating at CACFUS. Frequencies for use with Army aircraft can not be determined until the frequency coverage of the Army aircraft radio equipment is known. Personnel and ground equipment are covered in detail later.

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ANNEX D (CONT)

(b)(1) The only method of air-ground visual signalling used at CACTUS has been panel signalling in accordance with reference (b), enclosed, aircraft pyrotechnic signals, and maneuver and sound signals as prescribed in reference (c), enclosed. Air-ground visual signalling has been considerably limited by the terrain characteristics of this area in that jungle growths and thick vegetation usually precludes good observation and makes visual communication difficult and often impossible. Where panels can be properly displayed, panels coupled with dropped messages have been the most reliable and successful method. It is understood that colored smoke signals for use by aircraft are being developed. It is believed that when smoke signals are available they will provide the most reliable daylight method for planes signalling ground stations. Flashing light methods have not been used at CACTUS but prior experience indicated that light signals are reliable during daylight only for transmitting a few prearranged meanings.

(2) As stated above, at the present time panel signalling and dropped messages work best. Colored smoke signals for aircraft, and also for ground use, appear to present a promise of satisfactory air-ground visual communication during daytime, and flashing light, possibly with color combinations, at night. Appropriate aircraft and ground smoke signals and an aircraft blinker signal lamp with color combinations, that can be keyed, are needed to accomplish this. Visual signalling has been practicable at CACTUS only because our air forces have had complete local control of the air, a condition that may never again exist. Lacking this control, ordinary air-ground visual communication as practiced in the past will be impossible and past methods must be considered at their best as only emergency methods that probably will meet with little success. High altitude high speed planes which can stay in the air, can read only the most simple panel display or other simple visual signals. It is believed that the radio procedure prescribed in reference (d) represents the only feasible solution for communication with aircraft.

(c) Calls used in air-ground communication are prescribed in reference (c), copies enclosed. Assigned calls are subject to modification by special arrangement for specific operations. The only code used for panel signalling is that enclosed as reference (b), the key being prescribed in reference (c). No authenticators are used locally and none have been found necessary. Past experience has been that authenticators have never worked well for air-ground communication unless of a very simple nature, such as a key word or phrase that can be easily remembered by pilots, from which is extracted certain predetermined letters.

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ANNEX D (CONT)

The time element involved makes the use of any extensive code impracticable for direct support aircraft communication. The method of panel signalling contained in reference (e) may prove to be satisfactory. It has not been placed in effect at CACTUS as a change in the system used was not considered desirable. The assignment of specific numeral groups to panel meanings should not be made in reference (e), but should be made locally or in Operation Orders so that associated numerals and meanings may be frequently changed. It must be assumed that any code is compromised when the first friendly plane fails to return. For this reason, any aircraft code used in Amphibious Operations that does not permit frequent change is impracticable. Reference (e), if used in aircraft, will quickly become compromised.

(d) The grid system of 1st Marine Division D-2 Map No. 104 is in current use. Designation of a point ground target by grids to aircraft in the air is impracticable. Area targets may be designated by grid reference. For special operations prominent terrain features have been given letter designations and used as reference points. This method works very well. In areas in which artillery concentrations have been planned artillery concentration numbers may be readily used to designate those areas to aircraft. It will be noted that reference (b) provides for the designation of targets using panels and a direction arrow.

(e) Various types of ground radio equipment have been used for communication with aircraft, among which are the following:

Navy radio equipments Models TBX, TBW, GF/RU, GP/RU and TCS.

Army radio equipments Types SCR-284 and SCR-245.

Low powered sets such as the TBX and SCR-284 have only sufficient range to work reliably with aircraft within ten miles. These portable type of equipment are the only types provided that can be carried through jungle areas and over difficult terrain where vehicles can not be used. Where vehicles can be operated, so that the more powerful types of sets named above can be used, the radius of reliable radio communication increases. For distances of 40 to 50 miles under field conditions, radio equipment having a voice power output of 40 or more watts, such as the GP, TBW, or equivalent Army sets, must be used. Such sets, due to their weight and primary power requirements, must be installed in vehicles and therefore can not accompany units operating over terrain which prevents the passage of vehicles. Under such circumstances, radio communication, using field equipment, between the ground unit and

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the aircraft ground station can be established. Provided radio equipment mounted in trucks is made available to Aviation Liaison Groups in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 6 of reference (d), and provided there has been sufficient preliminary air-ground training, satisfactory communication can be obtained with supporting aircraft.

(f) Except to provide for the local assignment of code letters of the Direct Support Air-Ground Signals to meanings, thus providing for frequent change to reduce the possibility of compromise, no other changes are considered desireable or necessary in reference (d). The procedure therein is sound, adequate and capable of producing the results desired. To achieve these results it is only necessary to fully carry out the provisions specified therein, and to conduct direct support aircraft training. Unless such training can be conducted successful employment of direct support aircraft can not be expected. Aviation Liaison Groups, equipment and aircraft for training have always been sadly lacking in the past, a condition that should not be tolerated in the future. Any landing operation will probably result in failure if direct support aircraft can not be successfully employed. No plan for the employment of direct support aircraft, regardless of how perfect it may be, will work in combat unless adequate training has been accomplished.

(g) It must be anticipated that Army aircraft may be used to provide direct air support for ground units in landing operations. A common procedure for the employment of direct support aircraft should therefore be used by Army, Navy and Marine forces. It is believed that Reference (e) could well be adopted by all services for this purpose in order to insure common doctrine, mutual understanding and uniformity of training.

2. The following recommendations are made:

(a) That Aviation Liaison Groups and equipment as specified in paragraph 6 of reference (d) be formed and provided Divisions at the earliest practicable date. That ample aircraft be made available during training periods for training in all phases of air-ground communications and for employment as direct support aircraft, and no landing operations against enemy forces be conducted until this has been accomplished.

(b) That smoke signals for both air and ground use, and a signal lamp with color combinations capable of being keyed for use in aircraft, be developed and provided without delay.

**[REDACTED]**  
ANNEX D (CONT)

(c) That the system of panel signalling in reference (e) be subjected to trial in training periods and placed in effect only if proved satisfactory.

(d) That reference (d) and (e), or revisions thereof satisfactory to both services, be adopted for common use by the Army and Navy.

A. A. VANDEGRIFT

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[REDACTED] ANNEX E

ARTILLERY  
PHASE IV

Three operations of importance took place during this phase.

On 21 August a force of Japanese attacked the positions held by the 1st Marines along the Tenaru River. Hostile activity was first noticed about 0230 and at 0400 had developed to a point calling for artillery fire. Commencing at 0403, the 3rd Battalion, 11th Marines, in direct support of this sector, fired two prepared concentrations in front of the 1st Marines. At 0515 these same concentrations were repeated. At 0722, 0742, and 0851, observed fires were fired in the same general area. At about 0900, two batteries were shifted to support the counter attack of the Division Reserve. At 0927, received orders to cease firing as own troops were moving into the area.

The 5th Battalion, 11th Marines was alerted to fire if necessary to reinforce the 3rd Battalion. At 0830, one battery was put in field position to fire air spot on call, but was not used. At 0922, fired two batteries, interdicting the mouth of the Ilu River to prevent retreat of Japanese forces.

Observation was very restricted. Observed fires were fired by forward observers. Fire control was normal.

Ammunition expended was 375 rounds 75mm pack howitzers, and 30 rounds 105mm howitzers.

The lessons learned in this operation were:

(1) Artillery using super quick fuze is most effective against troops in wooded areas, particularly the coconut groves of the tropics. One report from prisoners indicated that one unit of approximately 100 men all but six were casualties as a result of one artillery concentration.

(2) Only experienced officers, preferably of the rank of Captain or above, should be used as liaison officers with infantry regiments. When possible, either the artillery battalion commander or executive officer should be sent to the infantry regimental C.P. at first sign of enemy activity.

On 27 August the 2nd and 5th Battalions, 11th Marines, fired on Matanikau village in conjunction with a landing operation of the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines near the village of Kokumbona. Observation was by Higgins boat, and communication by radio. Fire

[REDACTED] ANNEX E (CONT)

control normal. Ammunition expended: 45 rounds 75 pack howitzer, and 30 rounds 105mm howitzer.

This action was in the nature of a diversion, and not in direct support of the infantry, as the latter were beyond artillery range.

On 13 September, 1942, the 1st Raider Battalion and 1st Parachute Battalion occupied positions on the bare ridges just to the south of the airfield. The fifth Battalion, 11th Marines, had one battery in field position headed south in direct support of this area, with an observer post and liaison officer. Communications by wire from 5th Battalion switchboard to Raider switchboard and line direct from 5th Battalion to observer. Observer was posted about 150 yards south of Edson Ridge at a front line listening post maintained by Special Weapons Battery, Eleventh Marines. In preparation for support, one battery of the 5th Battalion had been registered to the south early in the afternoon and a few concentrations plotted. Accurate plotting was impossible due to the fact that the area in question did not show on the map, because of a cloud in the aerial mosaic.

Observer reported the enemy in the woods, in front of his position; also evidence of enemy about 1000 yards south. We fired on the route of approach approximately in this area about 2100. All was quiet for a few minutes, then observer reported increased activity in woods to his immediate front, about 200 yards. Colonel Edson gave his permission and fire was brought in this area with one battery about 2130. This seemed to create some confusion among the enemy and a few were seen to come out of the edge of the woods towards the ridge our troops were holding. It being apparently something bigger than ordinary night patrol skirmishes, the second battery in the field was shifted from the west to the south, and the third battery started from its regular position into the field position.

At about 2200 a heavy concentration was again fired into this area and the enemy started coming out of the woods towards our lines in force. The observer party had to move back to our front lines so that we were temporarily out of communication.

From that time on until after daylight on the morning of 14 September, continuous fire in support of the operation was maintained on various areas by one or more batteries. Most of the firing was very close to our own front lines, 200 yards and less in some instances. Normal communications were disrupted, and various expedients were used to maintain communication. With only short

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ANNEX E (CONT)

breaks, wire communication was maintained throughout the operation either through our own lines or through other units found to be in operation. From time to time one battery was used to search known routes of approach and assembly areas. The majority of heavy firing was at, and even below, minimum range, from 1600 to 2000 yards. A standing barrage was maintained in the draw just south of the C.P. Ridge from 0200 until daylight and apparently effectively blocked this flank of the position.

A total of 1992 rounds of 105mm howitzer ammunition was expended in this operation.

The Japanese also made secondary attacks on both flanks, with an attack of fair proportions on the western flank in the area held by the 5th Marines. The 2nd and 3rd battalion, 11th Marines, fired in support of the flanks. Total ammunition expended 878 rounds 75mm pack howitzer.

This action again emphasized the necessity for adequate maps for artillery. The 5th Battalion was seriously handicapped in this action because the map did not cover the territory in which most of the fire was placed.

Another point to be considered is that in jungle warfare the artillery of a defensive setup should not be placed too close to the infantry lines. The added range obtained by placing the artillery well forward is of no value unless observation of the terrain permits of its use, which will very seldom be the case. Artillery too close to the infantry is not only needlessly exposed but is actually less effective because of the limits imposed by minimum range considerations, and, in the case of 105mm howitzers, the impossibility of using high-angle fire at ranges less than 2800 yards.

C.G., 11th Marines

T. B. HUGHES  
LtCol., U.S. Marine Corps,

4 March, 1943.

F.C. MANER  
by direction.

S  
GDG/eas

ANNEX F  
FIFTH MARINES, FIRST MARINE DIVISION,  
FLEET MARINE FORCE,  
C/o Postmaster, San Francisco, Calif.

March 3, 1943.

RECORD EVENTS - 21 August, 1942 to September 18, 1942.

August 21, 1942 -

At 0200, heavy small arm and mortar firing was heard from Tenaru River area occupied by 1st Marines. It was believed to be an enemy landing force attacking. At 0230, artillery fire from our own artillery was heard joining in the fire fight. 0400 - On order of Division, 1st Bn 5th Marines, less beach defense guns, was ordered to assembly area to be prepared to assist 1st Marines. At 0600, our aircraft took to the air. At 0830, I-3-5 was ordered to proceed along beach to the east bank of Matanikau River and contact any enemy west of that river. 0900 - Word was received from Division that the enemy was in some force and were armed with rifles, machine guns and mortars and that they were attempting to force the Tenaru River but the 1st Marines had the situation well in hand. 1100 - Enemy bombers overhead escorted by zero fighters. These were engaged by our fighters and one zero shot down. 1315 - I-3-5 returned and reported only two enemy met. Both were killed. At about 1900 received word that the 2nd Bn 5th was coming over from Tulagi. 1930 - Received report on enemy landing. It was a force of about 1000 who had landed on 18 August, 1942 on North Coast of Guadalcanal, East of Division area. The 2nd Bn of the 1st engaged the enemy on the west bank of the Tenaru River while the 1st Bn, 1st Marines, crossed the river south of the main fire fight and enveloped their position, completely surrounding and annihilating the entire force. Results as of 1700 - 700 Japanese known to be killed, 2 prisoners taken. An undetermined number drowned and shot in the waters of Tenaru River and ocean while trying to escape, 1st Marines continuing cleaning up the area. 2100 - 2nd Bn, 5th Marines, landed at Kukum and bivouacked in l-5 area.

August 22, 1942 -

0800 - I-3-5 left to patrol east bank of Matanikau River. 1030 - 5 P-400 planes arrived and landed on airfield. 1400 - I-3-5 returned and reported no contact with the enemy. Continued consolidating defense positions.

August 23, 1942 -

1800 - Torpedo fired at U.S.S. FORMAHAUTT. Torpedo missed and came upon beach in l-5 defense area. Continued consolidating defense positions.

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ANNEX F (CONT)

August 24, 1942 -

0200 - Naval gunfire received from enemy submarine, one shell hitting near a Weapons Company 37mm position wounding 4 men.  
1430 - 9 enemy bombers, escorted by zeros, overhead, slight damage done. Bombers attacked by our fighters. 1530 - Division reported that our fighters downed 21 enemy planes in our area, some before and others after bombing our area. 1915 - Small enemy patrol reported in upper Lunga River area outside our defense area. Defense area extended.

August 25, 1942 -

0001 - 4 enemy ships (cruiser and destroyer type) fired on Regimental area. A number of shells hit in center of Regimental C.P., doing little material damage. Two men killed, 6 wounded.  
0100 - Our planes took off from field to contact enemy. 1020 - Received word from Division that our planes had damaged two Japanese transports and one cruiser about 150 miles off shore, headed this way. 1130 - 21 Japanese bombers (two motor) came over and bombed airfield. One man wounded, slight damage done to field.

August 26, 1942 -

Continued to consolidate positions. 2nd Bn burned grassy field near their area. 1145 - Air raid by 16 Japanese bombers, escorted by fighters. No damage done. Enemy lost 8 bombers and 9 fighters. We lost 1 fighter. 1700 - H-2-5 relieved 1-5 beach defenses. 1-5 moved into assembly position preparatory to daylight embarkation.

August 27, 1942 -

0540 - 1st Bn embarked at Kukum beach, with mission of landing 1000 yards west of Kokumbona Village, sweeping eastward to Matanikau in time to reembark and return to Kukum by dark.  
0700 - 1-5 landed at designated beach in column of companies. No opposition. 0800 - Co C secured high ground 800 yards inland; 1st Bn commenced moving down trail to the east with Co C moving along the ridges on the right flank of the battalion. No opposition in Kokumbona or nearby villages, but evidence that small numbers of Japs were living therein. Thatched houses were burned and small caches of munitions destroyed. One prisoner, workman, captured. Progress of covering company on ridges made Bn advance along trail very slow. 1140 - Advance platoon of Co B hit by enemy sniper, MG, and light mortar fire. This action commenced along the trail about 1500 yards east of Kokumbona, between the ocean

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ANNEX F (CONT)

and a coral ridge 300 yard inland. Close in flanking efforts were stopped by MG fire. 81mm and 60mm mortar fire partially silenced enemy firing. About 1530, battalion C.O. ordered units to commence withdrawal to re-embark and return to Lunga-Kukum defensive area. Upon receipt of this information, Regt'l C.O., by radio dispatch, relieved 1st Bn C.O. and ordered 1-5 to stay in field until enemy defeated. 1600 - Regt'l C.O., with part of L-3-5, left Kukum by boat to take charge Kokumbona action. 1750 - Regt'l C.O. arrived Kokumbona, ordered 1-5 to occupy high ground 2000 yards S.W. of Kokumbona and to move against the enemy at daylight. At 0610, I-3-5 left their bivouac area with orders to proceed along the beach trail, cross the Matanikau River, and to wipe out any enemy opposition encountered, and to push on until they meet the 1st Bn. Two Japanese were killed by I Co before they reached the Matanikau and the River itself was crossed with no opposition. At approximately 1600, I Co encountered enemy opposition about 2000 yards west of the Matanikau. At 1610, Col Whaling joined I-3-5. Attempts were made to flank the enemy positions by two squads of I Co, but these proved unsuccessful because of heavy enemy machine gun and mortar fire. I Co then dug in for the night.

August 28, 1942 -

At 0500 I Co pushed forward, the enemy having withdrawn during the night and operations of previous day continued during night and morning, both units making contact half way between the two villages, most of the enemy retreated into the mountains between the two meeting forces. Enemy casualties were about 20 killed and quite a few wounded. In the enemy area there was found a large quantity of enemy ammunition and material which was destroyed or brought back and turned over to Division. The losses of the regiment were 5 killed and 18 wounded. At about 1500 all units returned and reoccupied Lunga-Kukum defensive positions. 1800 - Received word from Division that our air force had sunk 3 enemy destroyers about 80 miles from Guadalcanal.

August 29, 1942 -

0425 - Bombed by about 18 enemy planes, all bombs fell outside Regimental area. 1245 - bombed by about 14 enemy bombers escorted by zero fighters. No damage done in Regimental area. Continued consolidating positions and unloading destroyers and boats bringing supplies.

August 30, 1942 -

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ANNEX F (CONT)

0005 - Received word from Division to expect bombing and shell fire from enemy planes and ships. 0010 - Received word that 5 enemy cruisers were in the vicinity. 1100 - Enemy planes overhead but because of rain no bombs were dropped. 1430 - 18 new Grumman fighters arrived to replace ones which had been damaged or shot down. 1435 - Bombed by enemy bombers. Some bombs hit beach in 3-5 area, others hit on or near the U.S.S. CALHOUN which sank in 3½ minutes. About 90 of the crew were saved. 1900 - Received word that 2 Japanese cruisers and 2 destroyers sighted 100 miles off, headed our way.

August 31, 1942 -

0045 - Naval gunfire and bombing was heard off coast about 20 miles NE. 0050 - Received word Japanese were landing troops on beach 20 miles NE of our positions. Two APD's and two destroyers came in today. 1250 - K-3-5 sent patrol to Matanikau River. No contact reported. Continued consolidating positions. 1300 - Air raid but no damage done.

September 1, 1942 -

Continued consolidating positions. Air raid alarm at 1220 but secured at 1345 with no planes visible overhead.

September 2, 1942 -

0400 - Received word that two cruisers and a transport were unloading troops near Tavui Point. 1135 - Japanese bombers and some fighters bombed area starting some fires and destroying several planes, drums of oil and ammunition. Two bombs fell in 5th Marines area.

September 3, 1942 -

0100 - Received naval gunfire from submarines off coast. No casualties. 0845 - Bombed by enemy planes. No casualties.

September 4, 1942 -

0445 - 2-5 left on patrol to Kokumbona area. Two companies (E,F), proceeded along the ridge approximately 1 mile from the beach while G Co and H Co proceeded along the beach with Bn Hdqs. 1235 - bombed by enemy bombers. No casualties.

September 5, 1942 -

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ANNEX F (CONT)

0045 - Shelled by Japanese cruiser and 4 destroyers. 1 man killed. 1015 - Bombed by enemy bombers. 1217 - Bombed by enemy bombers. 1300 - 2-5 returned from patrol, reported that they contacted and killed about 6 Japanese soldiers and burned a small amount of Japanese supplies.

September 6, 1942 -

Continued consolidating positions. Exceptionally quiet all day with no air raid alarms.

September 7, 1942 -

Continued consolidating positions. Another quiet day and night with no air raid alarms.

September 8, 1942 -

Continued consolidating positions. Air raid alarm at 1825 was secured at 2000 with no planes overhead.

September 9, 1942 -

1125 - Bombed by enemy bombers. Continued consolidating positions. G-2-5 brought four enemy prisoners in who surrendered during night at the 2nd Bn CP.

September 10, 1942 -

0030 - Enemy naval gunfire off shore, objective Tulagi Harbor. 1000 - Bombed by enemy bombers, 26 enemy planes in all. All clear at 1245.

September 11, 1942 -

0745 - I and L Companies of the 3rd Bn left on patrol to Matanikau River area. 1000 - Bombed by enemy bombers. 1230 - Bombed by enemy bombers. Lt. Col. Rosecrans, Bn Commander, 2nd Bn and Major Skinner, Executive Officer, 2nd Bn, were injured during the bombing near the airfield while enroute to Division CP; concussion blew them out of a shelter. Colonel W. J. Whaling, Regt'l Executive Officer took command of the 2nd Bn during the absence of Colonel Rosecrans. 24 Grumman fighters arrived late this afternoon with more expected soon.

September 12, 1942 -

ANNEX F (CONT)

0825 - Bombed by enemy bombers, 0830 - 1 platoon from 3-5 left on patrol to Matanikau River area. 1245 - Enemy planes dropped incendiary papers in area. 1500 - Patrol from 3-5 returned and reported contact with enemy. One Jap soldier killed. 2200 - Received naval gunfire from 1 enemy cruiser and 1 destroyer. Damage slight. 2300 - Received enemy naval gunfire from 5 enemy destroyers. Damage slight. Report on air fight earlier in day received with news that land based planes downed 12 enemy bombers and 3 fighters and we lost 2 fighters. The enemy planes then ran into a group of carrier based fighters and lost many more, making a total of 31 enemy planes downed in complete action.

September 13, 1942 -

0920 - I-3-5 left on patrol to the village of Matanikau, 1030 - Bombed by 25 enemy bombers. Damage slight. 1400 - I-3-5 returned from patrol. Reported killed 2 Jap soldiers. 1430 - Area strafed by enemy float planes. 2 of our planes shot down while landing. 2330 - Received naval gunfire from 2 enemy destroyers and one cruiser. Damage slight.

September 14, 1942 -

0053 - 2 enemy destroyers and 1 cruiser sighted about 15,000 yards off 5th Marines area going from East to West, 0330 - 3rd Bn reported being attacked by strong enemy force estimated to be about 1000 men. 0830 - 3rd Bn reported 4 men killed and 9 men wounded. Enemy attack defeated with an estimated loss of about 40 killed and considerable number of wounded. 0950 - Bombed by 23 enemy bombers. Damage slight. 1030 - I and L Companies reestablished contact with the enemy. Sniping continued to about 1430 when I Company moved out on ridge forcing enemy to withdraw leaving a number of dead and considerable equipment behind. On the night of 13-14 September the 2nd Bn, 5th Marines, moved into Division Reserve and then relieved the Raider Bn and Parachute Bn in the front lines behind the Division CP. During the action in defense of Henderson Field, 5 men were killed and 55 wounded. It was estimated that several hundred of the enemy were killed.

September 15, 1942 -

0915 - Our lines extended, the 1st Bn moving out to the line of ridges opposite the airfield with left flank on river, right flank in contact with the 3rd Bn, 5th. 1330 - Bombed by 18 enemy bombers. Slight damage. 1-5 and 3-5 send out patrols to south and west. Had contact with small patrols, several prisoners taken and sent to Division. 2115 - Enemy machine gun opened fire on B-1-5.

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[REDACTED] ANNEX F (CONT)

Firing silenced by mortar fire from B Company.

September 16, 1942 -

0845 - L-3-5 left on patrol to Matanikau. 2110 - Bombed by enemy bombers. Damage slight. 1355 - L-3-5 returned from patrol. Reported one Jap soldier in Matanikau Village who ran into woods when patrol approached. Continued consolidating regimental positions.

September 17, 1942 -

0852 - L-3-5 left on patrol to west. 0915 - Patrol from Hq 5th passed through 1st Bn lines, patrolling to South and West. 1500 - H&S patrol returned. Reported one Jap soldier was seen in village who ran when patrol approached.

September 18, 1942 -

0430 - 7th Marines, reinforced arrived and landed in 5th Marines beach area. 0700 - 2 liaison officers sent aboard destroyer to direct naval gunfire on Kokumbona area. 0800 - L-3-5 left on patrol to West. 1400 - L-3-5 returned. Reported no contact.

G. D. GAYLE,  
Capt., U.S.M.C.,  
R - 3

**ANNEX G**

FIRST MARINES, FIRST MARINE DIVISION,  
FLEET MARINE FORCE.

**"HISTORY OF THE FIRST MARINE REGIMENT"**

**PHASE IV**  
(20 August -- 18 September)

20-21 August Battle of the Tenaru.

Contact was established with an unidentified Japanese unit of approximately 1000 strong at 0310, 21 August, 1942. According to information obtained from questioning three prisoners, this force consisted of separate units which had made a rendezvous in mid-ocean south of Truk on the 14th or 15th of August and had been landed on Guadalcanal the 18th. Some of these units came from Guam, Japan, and Truk. One, consisting of 200 men, left Hokkaido, Japan, on the 11th on transports, was transferred to two destroyers in mid-ocean four days later and was landed on Guadalcanal the 18th approximately 25 miles east of the Tenaru River. They marched westward for two nights, hiding away during the daytime, until they made contact with our forces the morning of the 21st. During the engagement the enemy exhibited no sign of reserve power.

At 2030, 20 August, two members of the Second Battalion beach patrol reported a white flare which rose from the woods east of the Tenaru River. When they saw the flare the members of the patrol were in the vicinity of the point on the western side of the mouth of the Tenaru River. At 2400 a sentry stationed on the point, fired at someone on the other side of the river who did not answer his challenge.

At 0310 the enemy launched the initial attack on the point with hand grenades, smoke bombs, machine gun fire. The infantry attempted to cross the sandbar, which closes the mouth of the Tenaru, to engage our troops with the bayonet. Approximately 200 of them tried to force the point, but our forces held firm and drove them back to the eastern bank of the river. There they dug in, engaged our forces in a fire fight and concentrated mortar fire on the point in an endeavor to demolish our positions. With the increasing effectiveness of our small arms, automatic fire and artillery concentrations, some of the enemy attempted to withdraw eastward along the shore in landing boats which had been lying in the vicinity of Red Beach. Our planes strafed them for a distance

ANNEX G (CONT)

[REDACTED] of five miles down the coast. As the fight progressed during daylight, the enemy found themselves enveloped by our First Battalion, supported by a company of tanks, and facing the sharp fire of the Second Battalion along the west bank of the Tenaru. They fought to annihilation.

It is estimated that over 900 of the enemy were killed. One surrendered and 14 were taken prisoner. The enemy was well equipped with automatic rifles, machine guns, mortars, hand grenades, smoke bombs, flame throwers, anti-tank bombs, maps of the area and camouflage nets. Their morale was judged to be high. Their assault across the sand spit at the mouth of the Tenaru was delivered determinedly and with almost fanatical disregard for the heavy fire that was annihilating them. Examination of captured documents and prisoners revealed that a great portion of this force were seasoned troops and had served at Saipan, Guam, Midway and Truk. The unit of 200 that came from Hokkaido had been training for a year and were on their first campaign.

Twenty-five (25) Marines were killed in the Second Battalion and forty-four (44) wounded. Seven (7) were killed in the First Battalion and thirteen (13) wounded. Two (2) were killed in the Special Weapons Battalion and fourteen (14) wounded. One (1) was wounded in Regimental Weapons Company. Three (3) were wounded in H & S Company. Total - Thirty-four (34) killed and seventy-five (75) wounded. Reorganization was completed at 1800.

The following enemy weapons were captured:

- 10 Heavy Machine Guns
- 20 Light Machine Guns
- 20 Heavy Grenade Throwers
- 700 Rifles
- 20 Pistols
- Undetermined number of sabres, hand grenades and Bangalore Torpedoes.
- 3 70mm Battalion Guns.
- 12 Flame Throwers.
- Demolition Equipment.

Improving defenses, fortifying and mining the sand spit across the mouth of the Tenaru and extensive patrolling was the order of the day in preparation for any eventuality.

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## ANNEX G (CONT)

25 August, a "G" Company, Second Battalion patrol under Captain Sherman, captured two Japanese Soldiers east of the Tenaru River in the vicinity of the Block Four River.

9 September, a patrol from "I" Company, Third Battalion, under Lieutenant Barry, engaged a small enemy force of about 15 men at the edge of the woods south of Beach Red. A brief skirmish ensued. At least two enemy were killed or wounded. The next day another patrol under Lieutenant Barry engaged a Japanese patrol of approximately 20 men in the vicinity of Beach Red. Three Japanese were wounded.

11 September, a "G" Company, Second Battalion patrol under Captain Sherman, engaged a Japanese patrol and killed 3 to 6 enemy.

### Notes on the Japanese as observed in the Battle of the Tenaru.

#### WEAPONS (Officers)

All carried sabers and automatic pistols of various makes ranging in caliber from .25 to .38.

The Nambu automatic pistol (model 1925), cal. 7mm - found on several officers. The 8mm cal. of the same make was carried by many of the non-commissioned officers.

Like the colt the Nambu can be stripped without tools. The rear sight is in front of the grip beneath the trigger guard. Weight 2lbs, muzzle velocity 950 feet per second.

#### WEAPONS (Individual Soldier)

Two types of rifles; one, the Arushe, cal..256, (model 1905), the other the cal. 7.7mm, model 1919 of the same make.

Bayonets, carried by every soldier, very sharp, and with the hooked ring below handle to catch opponent's blade. In the hand to hand fighting at Hell's Point it was noted that they held their bayonets in their hands and used them as swords.

Handgrenades - Their effectiveness and bursting radius were noted as slight. Each soldier carried several, used them frequently.

Dynamite, TNT and other demolition materials carried in considerable quantity.

Parts for machine guns and other weapons carried in special oil-treated cloths.

All automatic weapons have flash-hiders.

Heavy grenade thrower (model 189), used effectively.

Nambu LMG, cal. 7.7mm.

70mm Battalion Gun.

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## ANNEX G (CONT)

Anti-tank grenades, fitted with magnets, canvas covered, with four square magnets attached to outside. Pull pin and T explodes in approximately nine seconds. Can be thrown successfully from short distances.

Flame throwers, land mines, bangalore torpedoes were carried but never used.

### INDIVIDUAL EQUIPMENT

The Japanese pack, all noted as scrupulously clean, contained:

Camouflage nets for helmet and shoulder with twigs and grass woven into them.

Artificial grasses of different colors.

Three piece set of cooking utensils.

Two or three cans of food, sweet cakes, bread and rice.

Extra pair of shoes, either sneakers or hobnails, underclothes, socks, toilet articles.

Almost without exception, a diary.

In many cases, opium.

In some of the packs were small Japanese flags with writing scrawled on them. No tactical use of these flags was noted.

Each soldier carried a first aid kit containing two sterile triangular bandages and two picric acid guazes for burns.

Officers and non-commissioned officers carried heavy leather dispatch cases, well supplied with maps of this area, notebooks etc.

### COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT

(This information was obtained by a communicator who accompanied a patrol of the 1st Battalion which engaged and annihilated a Japanese patrol of men and officer on 12 August. In what little time he had noted the following):

Portable field radio - ultra high frequency - 3 tubes, self-contained battery. Size approximately 10"x3"x8". Similar to our TBY.

Another larger radio set - about 18"x10"x10". Two tubes, simply constructed. Batteries carried in a separate unit.

Field telephone - in wooden box - somewhat similar to our own.

Several reels of assault wire, some colored yellow, some black. The wire is strong with heavy insulation.

Telephones use single strand wire - ground return.

Blinker signal consisting of a luminous plate about 5 inches in diameter inserted in a tube approximately 4 inches long.

~~S-1~~ ANNEX G (CONT)

TACTICS

The Japanese, in attempting to gain a foothold at the point on the western side of the mouth of the Tenaru River, relied on the surprise of a quick night attack, assault in large numbers and supporting fire from heavy and light machine guns and heavy grenade throwers. Rather than keeping low to the sand spit which closes the mouth of the Tenaru and infiltrating across, they charged standing straight up with small intervals between men and receiving our fire continued to expose themselves with utter disregard for life. Those that were able to reach this side of the river were in great confusion and for the most part leaderless. The officers, who led the advance across the sandbar were the first to be shot.

Their tendency to bunch up was demonstrated further after they had been driven back to the east bank of the river. Three or four of their machine guns were placed so close together that they were within the bursting radius of one of our heavy mortar shells. Five men were seen taking cover around the same tree.

On the other side of the river the Japanese, held by the fire of the 2nd Battalion from the west bank of the river, enveloped by the 1st Battalion and subjected to artillery concentrations, had little choice of tactics. They dug in as much as they were able in small defensive units and engaged in the fire fight. Their marksmanship was poor. Their individual camouflage good. Snipers fired from the tops of coconut trees.

In the heat of battle the Japanese hid behind their own dead, even played dead and smeared blood on themselves, and sniped at our troops. When facing capture, many committed hari-kari by detonating handgrenades held close to their midriffs.

37mm cannister proved to be a devastating type of ammunition.

13-16 September Battle of Bloody Ridge

At 2215, 13 September, a group of enemy attacked "K" Company, Third Battalion, listening post, which was commanded by Lieutenant Terzi and which was located in the jungle just west of the Ilu River and about 600 yards east of the Third Battalion positions along the upper regions of the Tenaru River. Terzi's listening post withdrew.

"K" Company opened fire at 0015, 14 September, and engaged the enemy until 1400. 28 enemy dead were observed along "K" Company barbed wire, and evidence was later found of more dead and wounded having been dragged back by the enemy to his lines. "K" Company was supported by mortars, tanks and artillery all of which

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ANNEX G (CONT)

accounted for an undetermined number of the enemy.

14-15 September - The Third Battalion fired intermittently at the enemy throughout the night. Strength of the attacking force was estimated to be one battalion reenforced with 70mm field pieces and AT guns.

15-16 September - Intermittent enemy mortar and light artillery fire on Third Battalion positions. Returned fire with our mortars and artillery and believed to have knocked out several enemy mortars and field pieces.

Total enemy casualties inflicted on the enemy during the period 13-16 September estimated to be 200.

17 September - A "G" Company, Second Battalion patrol under Captain Sherman captured on Japanese heavy grenade thrower, one heavy machine gun, two full grenade carriers, three boxes of .303 ammunition and one bangalore torpedo. On the same day the First Battalion under Lieutenant Colonel Cresswell advanced on a battalion in force up the Lunga River and engaged an undetermined number of enemy killing approximately 50. Our losses were 18.

In both battles the Japanese had shown their preference for night fighting. Consequently night security was stressed and outpost security doubled.

Both at the Tenaru and Bloody Ridge the Japanese charged our automatic weapons fiercely and fanatically with utter disregard for life. In many cases it was merely, holding 'em and squeezing 'em, mowing the enemy down as they assaulted. Our superior fire power was unquestionably invaluable.

Coordination of mortar and machine gun fire was effective. Mortar fire caused the Japs to stand up and run. As they did so, our machine guns covering the area where the mortars were landing, raked them with bullets.

At the Battle of the Tenaru the muzzle blasts of our 37mm guns blew the sand of the beach into the muzzles of the guns causing stoppages. Blankets were staked to the sand underneath the muzzles of the guns preventing the sand from being sucked into the muzzles of the guns.

It was found that very close infantry protection for 37mm and machine guns crews was essential to prevent enemy infantry from advancing so near to the gun emplacements as to be able to

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ANNEX G (CONT)

knock out the gun crews with handgrenade and bayonet.

Both at the Tenaru and Bloody Ridge, the Japanese relied on the surprise of quick night attack and furious assault to win the battle. Thereafter their tactics seemed for the most part to be to charge and charge again, though at the Tenaru they attempted a small flanking movement along the water's edge which was soon exterminated.

It was noted that the Japs in many cases assaulted with fixed bayonets not having a round of ammunition in their rifles. Their indoctrination training stressing bayonet fighting as the honorable and highly sought type of individual combat was fanatically carried out. In all hand to hand bayonet fighting the Japs were no match for our men.

The initial assault by our five tanks across the field east of our Third Battalion lines at the Battle of Bloody Ridge was entirely successful. They caused much havoc among the enemy and returned unharmed. Within an hour they attacked again over the same terrain. Meanwhile the Japanese had time to move 37mm (German made) AT guns into position along the wood's edge at the eastern side of the field. They opened fire on our tanks which were assaulting for the second time and knocked out three of them. It thus proved extremely unwise to attack over the same terrain again and especially within a period of time long enough to allow the enemy to bring their AT guns into position. The ammunition used by the Japanese to knock out our tanks was AP and HE combined.

ANNEX H

AVIATION ACTIVITIES ON GUADALCANAL

The first combatant aircraft arrived on 20 August 1942 when VMF 223 and VMBS 232 began their memorable tour of duty at Henderson Field. Much of the success of the Guadalcanal operation was due to the tireless efforts of these two squadrons and especially to their commanding officers Major R.C. Mangrum and Captain J.L. Smith. Beginning operations the very next day the first of many Japanese planes was shot down. From that time on aviation became a sore spot to the Japanese. All aircraft arriving at Henderson Field subsequently carried out operations as efficiently as the first group but under much better conditions. The forward echelon of Marine Air Group 23 arrived without any ground crews and no equipment. Service and maintenance was performed by a small detachment of men from Cub 11 assisted by all and any marine who happened to be handy. To these men should go the credit for air operations in the first stages of the Guadalcanal campaign. As equipment and personnel arrived the operations took on a more organized aspect and the results accordingly. This force was composed of Marine, Army, Navy and finally by New Zealand Air Force personnel and equipment.

Activity at the Pagoda increased and it finally became the control center for the entire air force on Guadalcanal until naval bombardment forced it to be abandoned.

The newly arrived air arm distinguished itself immediately on the first day of Phase IV by attacking Japanese forces at Tenaru and by engaging enemy aircraft.

Throughout the remainder of the Division occupation aircraft carried on all types of operations including aerial combat, strafing and bombing of enemy ground positions, reconnaissance both land and sea, attacks on surface vessels, food and message drops and utility missions between the islands including the rescue of stranded aviators and flights between the islands with various officials.

During the First Marine Division's stay on Guadalcanal aviation based there destroyed 416 Japanese planes, sank 21 Japanese vessels with the loss of 78 planes in combat; the crews of about 50 percent being saved.

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ANNEX H (1)

**ANNEX H (CONT)**

The principal operations by Aviation are listed below from day to day:

- 20 August 1942 - Forward echelon of Marine Group 23 Commanded by LtCol., C.L. Flike and consisting of VMF 223 (19F4F4s) Commanded by Major J.L. Smith and VMSB 232 (12SBD-3s) Commanded by LtCol., R.C. Mangrum arrived Henderson Field.
- 21 August 1942 - First contact with enemy aircraft, one Zero shot down our losses none.
- 24 August 1942 - Five P-400 of 67 Fighter Squadron arrived Henderson Field. Enemy losses 5 twin engine bombers, 5 single engine bombers and 11 land plane zeros. Our losses 3 F4F4s.
- 25 August 1942 - At 0300 three SBD-3s bombed destroyers and scored one hit. 0835 17 SBD-3s contacted enemy surface force and scored two hits on cruiser of Jiutsu class, believed sunk; direct hit on 14000 ton transport; possible hit on another transport; shot down 2 single float planes.
- 26 August 1942 - Enemy losses 7 twin engine bombers and 5 land plane zeros. Our losses one F4F4.
- 27 August 1942 - Nine P-400s arrived Henderson Field, the remainder of the 67th Fighter Squadron, U.S. Army Air Corps.
- 28 August 1942 - Thirteen SBD-3s attacked three large and one small destroyers 70 miles north of Guadalcanal. Three destroyers sunk, confirmed by coast watcher on Santa Isabel.
- 29 August 1942 - Enemy losses 3 twin engine bombers and 4 land plane zeros. One bomber shot down by 90mm AA. Our losses none.
- 30 August 1942 - Enemy losses 18 land plane zeros. Four P-400s lost 3 pilots missing. Eighteen F4F4 and 12 SBDs rear echelon of MAG 23 Commanded by Colonel W.J. Wallace arrived. VMF 224 Commanded by Major R.L. Galer and VMSB 233 Commanded by Major L.O. Smith. Calhoun (APD) sank by bombers, fighter made no contact.

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ANNEX H (CONT)

- 31 August 1942 - Three F4F4s lost on alert. No contact with enemy believed due to faulty oxygen equipment.
- 2 Sept. 1942 - Enemy losses 3 twin engine bombers and 4 land plane zeros. One twin engine bomber shot down by 90mm AA. Our losses none.
- 3 Sept. 1942 - Brigadier General Geiger CO 1st Mar Air Wing arrived. Four F4F4s arrived.
- 4 Sept. 1942 - SBDs bombed and strafed Japanese boats and landing craft at San Jorge Island.
- 5 Sept. 1942 - Strafing attack on Jap landing boats near Esperance. Several boats sunk 1 F4F4 lost. Enemy losses 2 twin engine bombers and 1 zero. Our losses 1 F4F4.
- 6 Sept. 1942 - Eleven SBDs and 6 F4F4s attacked Gizo Harbor.
- 7 Sept. 1942 - Strafing attack landing boats southeast tip of San Isabel Island. Four F4F4s arrived.
- 8 Sept. 1942 - Bombed Tasimboko preparatory to attack by 1st Raider Bn. Airfield in bad condition following two days rain.
- 9 Sept. 1942 - Enemy losses 5 twin engine bombers and 4 land plane zeros. Our losses 2 F4F4s. Fighter strip placed in commission.
- 10 Sept. 1942 - SBDs strafed and bombed Visale. Enemy losses 4 twin engine bombers and 1 land plane zero. Our losses 1 F4F4. Effective air strength 11 F4F4s, 22 SBDs, 3 P-400s. Twenty four F4F4s from Saratoga Lt Comdr Simpler arrived.
- 11 Sept. 1942 - Nine SBDs attacked Gizo. Enemy losses 6 twin engine bombers 1 land plane zero. Our losses 1 F4F4 pilot rescued. Twenty four F4F4s and 3 SBDs arrived.
- 12 Sept. 1942 - Enemy losses 10 twin engine bombers (3 by AA) and 4 land plane zeros. Our losses 1 F4F4, 3 SBDs. P-400s strafed landing craft near Tasimboko.

~~SECRET~~ ANNEX H (CONT)

- 13 Sept. 1942 - Enemy losses 4 twin engine bombers 4 land plane zeros. Our losses 4 F4F4s, 1 SBD-3. Twelve SBDs and 6 TBFs arrived.
- 14 Sept. 1942 - P-400s strafed enemy in rear of position. Enemy losses 1 twin engine bomber (Focke-Wulf), 9 single float biplanes, 2 land plane zeros, 4 float plane zeros.
- 16 Sept. 1942 - Thirteen SBDs and 5 TBFs attacked enemy surface force scored one torpedo hit on cruiser, 1 bomb hit and 2 near misses on second cruiser.
- 17 Sept. 1942 - Strafing attack on enemy boats at Maravovo.
- 18 Sept. 1942 - Six TBFs arrived.

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~~S~~ ANNEX I

EXTRACTS FROM OPERATIONS DAILY JOURNAL

21 August

<u>Time</u>	<u>Message</u>
0530	From CG to Asst Div Comdr - Is there any hostile activity your area
0637	From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Your 0530 negative X
0845	From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Nothing to report X All action observed from here appear to be on your side
0837	From D-2 to D-3 - 1st Regiment reports Japs landing right now E of Beach Red (Col Frisbie)
0930	From CG to Asst Div Comdr - At 1600 Love Calhoun Gregory Little 40 tons food each arrive Ringbolt today
1044	From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Your 210930 advise if these vessels available transfer combat team 2 your side
1130	From CG to Asst Div Comdr - Malaria control center recommends chemo prophylaxis against malaria all forces this area quinine grain six daily or atabrine two tablets twice weekly
1540	From Eng Patrol to CG - Nothing seen of enemy out here X If you have anything for me send to 3-11
1850	From CG to Asst Div Comdr - Seven hundred heavily armed Japs attempted to break through position mouth of Tenaru at Zero two hundred X Pollocks Bn fought them off till daybreak X Cresswell crossed up river outflanked them and with assistance of tanks destroyed entire force X Our casualties twenty eight killed seventy two wounded
2000	From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Combat Team 2 departed Tulagi for Guadalcanal 1930 on APDs

22 August

- 0025 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - R.J. Canavan seaman first class survivor from Higgins boat attacked by Jap destroyer swam ashore here X Being returned to you

[REDACTED] ANNEX I (CONT)

- 0845 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Nothing to report X Pollock  
Cresswell nice work best news yet
- 1110 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Headquarters Second Marines  
reporting for duty 0700
- 1120 From CG to Asst Div Comdr - Your 1018 welcome aboard  
glad to have you here
- 1308 From LtCol Cresswell to CG - Have reached and occupy line  
of Ilu River to narrow neck Tenaru River at (62.8-115.5)  
Co B (less one platoon one MG platoon Co D and tanks  
crossing Ilu to reconnoitered unidentified boat at Koli  
Point X Light sniper opposition encountered at (62.9-  
116.3) on Tenaru River
- 1400 From LtCol Cresswell to CG - My #2, 22 Aug - 4 Japs kil-  
led and 1 wounded in encounter near (62.9-116.3) Tenaru  
River. No other opposition encountered. Request air  
investigation of boat on tip of Koli Point if possible.  
Units across Ilu ordered to return by 1500
- 1600 Army P-400 arrived today Second group of airplanes

23 August

- 0915 From Air Patrol to CG - Two APDs and AK unloading Kukum  
X One Blue class destroyer damaged dead in water Tulagi  
X One Blue class destroyer proceeding across channel  
toward Lunga Point midway in channel
- 0945 From CG to Asst Div Comdr - Lakatoi due arrive Ringbolt  
25 August X Is 130 feet long single funnel has one mast  
and replies to visual challenge int with word tom X Has  
100 Ton food Eta 0630 X Will depart prior daylight day  
following arrival Lakatoi painted mottled green
- 1140 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Supply of TBX and TBY bat-  
teries exceedingly low X Request supply be sent first  
opportunity X Could also use TBX hand generator and  
generator cable
- 1140 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Aerial observation resumed  
Florida Island operation mostly reconnaissance tomorrow

**ANNEX I (CONT)**

- period Expect complete unloading AK 2100 X Have copy  
CTF62 Serial 0050 X Para 5 urgently recommend 1 battery  
5 inch Ringbolt X Para 4 and 5 enclosure recommends all  
APDs embark Raider Bn for these operations under your  
control X Paras 8 and 13 details tomorrow X Did CT dash  
2 arrive safely
- 1600 From CG to Asst Div Comdr - two enemy cruisers three de-  
stroyers four afirm prep headed this way X Can arrive  
zero two hundred X Our planes going after them and many  
others will join in
- 1745 5 friendly Catalina PBYs will fly over at 2130 do not  
fire on them X Ground crews will be working tonight on  
field gassing planes lights will be used do not fire  
on them
- 1745 Friendly planes expected over area in 15 minutes
- 1745 From CG to Asst Div Comdr - Five Catalinas will pass  
here at 2130 to attack hostile convoy
- 1750 From CG to CTF62 - DRX battery supply Tare Baker Xray  
Radio nearly exhausted X Request resupply earliest date  
for fifty sets Cactus twenty sets Ringbolt X Also Tare  
Baker yoke batteries and field telephone wire X Large  
supply was on Alchiba X Replacement piston connecting  
rod and bearing assembly for Tare Baker William radio  
also required

24 August

- 0930 From CG to Asst Div Comdr - Your 252000 last question  
affirmative
- 0945 From CG to Asst Div Comdr - Plane search shows no hostile  
force within radius of seventy five miles
- 0950 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Your 0845 affirmative
- 1730 From CG to Asst Div Comdr - Boat tomorrow to depart 0830  
for Ringbolt with small number of personnel and batteries  
X Return by boat ten personnel for two seven zero set  
third defense Horton and Josslyn X Boat will have plane

~~SECRET~~

ANNEX I (CONT)

coverage X Enemy vessels still near us but no definite information X Had bombing attack this afternoon our loss three fighters but got twenty one enemy planes and zeros X Have recommended Edson mop up all outlying detachments if favorable reply received here he should come here for aerial reconnaissance

- 2100 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Situation normal X Resumed Florida patrols
- 2358 Seven destroyers or possibly cruisers shell positions along beach X Slight damage and no known casualties X Then moved to northeast

25 August

- 0730 From CG to Asst Div Comdr - To much war today to send boat X Destroyers shelled us last night X Little damage X Hostile carrier not far away X Planes looking for him now
- 0820 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Your 241715 request 2 officers 2 NCOs Division QM Section Period 2 NCOs Commissary Section 1 officer 2 NCOs Munitions Section X Wire chief 6 telephone men and 7 radio operators X 10 field telephones X Letter follows others needed
- 0955 From CG to Asst Div Comdr - Did Lakaioi arrive
- 1045 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Your 250955 negative/nf
- 1127 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - 2GJ5 reports 21 planes heading southeast at 1100
- 1145 Attacked by 21 bombers which dropped approximately 21 bombs with slight damage X No zeros encountered
- 1717 From D-4 to Asst Div Comdr - Do you require diesel oil or 12 octane gasoline
- 1928 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Lieutenant Robert Reed shot down Lengo Point here alive and well

~~SECRET~~ ANNEX I (CONT)

- 1930 From CG to Asst Div Comdr - Our planes bombed destroyers which shelled us before daybreak got one hit X Did not locate carrier but did find convoy several cruisers and destroyers and four transports about one fifty miles north of Savo Island headed this way X One large transport hit midship and left burning another transport hit astern and heavy cruiser hit badly and burning X Wide search this afternoon well north of area revealed no vessels but great areas of water covered with oil
- 2133 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - All quiet Florida Island patrol still out

26 August

- 0800 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - All quiet
- 0830 From CG to Asst Div Comdr - Have you any information concerning operation or concealment motor torpedo boats in waters vicinity Florida Island
- 1123 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Your two six zero eight three zero negative X Three patrols still on Florida Island X Will report results upon their return
- 1145 16 unidentified 2 engine bombers reported headed this way from New Georgia expected over this area in three quarters of an hour
- 1215 16 bombers escorted by twelve zeros attacked and bombed positions X Slight damage to gasoline storage No known casualties
- 1345 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Your 260945 Gregory and Little at Tulagi Calhoun at Gavutu 21 August X Alhena at Tulagi 22 August
- 1435 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Your 251717 Urgently require diesel oil have plenty gasoline Major Enright
- 1600 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Require urgent delivery forty lister bags and fifteen thousand tubes each calcium hypochlorite and orthotoluene and sodium thiosulfate

~~SECRET~~

ANNEX I (CONT)

- 1945 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Your 261350 try following address Co rear echelon First Marine Raider Bn care CG American Division Numea New Caledonia
- 2300 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Florida patrols relieved X Encountered few poorly equipped disorganized Japs X No evidence torpedo boat operations X Recovered personal effects of Richard Joseph Hamilton who was buried by natives X All natives seem loyal and friendly X Have prepared pick up ground X Request pick up ten hundred tomorrow X Observation detachment will be established Tanaluva Point tomorrow

27 August

- 0735 From CG to Asst Div Comdr - How many boats have you by class and what is their condition
- 1320 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Smoke reported southend Savo Island about twelve thirty daily last three days
- 1320 From CG to Asst Div Comdr - Lt Caldwell aviator reports two landing boats in small cove north west tip Florida Island X Does not know if they are our or not
- 1635 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Four twenty seven thirteen twenty boats are establishing observation detachment Tanaluva Point
- 1635 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Your 270735 total number boat Ringbolt X WL 5 good condition 1 inoperative 1 decommissioned X TR 4 good 3 fair 1 decommissioned X TP 3 good 3 fair X distinguish 7 good 7 fair 1 inoperative 3 decommissioned X engage and routine requirements WL 5 TR 6 TP6 T 6 X No diesel fuel X Gober  
All stations - Aircraft proceeding Guadalcanal bombing attack expected about 1100 love X Stay clear field until it is over
- 2100 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Situation unchanged X Request plane pickup message at 0900 tomorrow

~~SECRET~~  
ANNEX I (6)

ANNEX I (CONT)

28 August

- 0605 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Request plane drop dozen bottles Paragoric
- 0830 From CG to Asst Div Comdr - Murray making boat trip Ring-bolt this morning X Message pickup by plane on arrival boat X Paragoric with Murray
- 1000 From Col Whaling to CG - Information 1st Bn I Company moving south along ridge and trail about 600 yds south of second village X Had contact with small group this morning X Should contact 1st Bn soon X
- 1025 From CG to Asst Div Comdr - Send Col Pepper and Col Edson here by boat tomorrow for conference X Return Wasp air director group to Cactus with Murray tomorrow
- 1110 From 5th Marines to CG - Have made contact with Col Hunt and 1st Bn X Request boats be sent to Matanakau proceeding to Matanakau immediately
- 1130 Unit report and Record of Events from Div Hq Company from Aug 8 to 13
- 1315 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Have 2 TRS request permission to return this P.M. X Departing 1500 X
- 1325 From CG to Asst Div Comdr - Permission granted Murray return X Air coverage arranged fifteen hundred
- 2100 From CG to Asst Div Comdr - Upon arrival APDs transfer entire Raider Bn this island X Instruct Griffith prepare embark three reinforced rifle companies complete combat echelon Bn Hq tomorrow night as planned which will return here for duty completion operations remainder Bn with all equipment be prepared move here tomorrow any time after arrival convoy
- 2330 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Recommend that ship unloading here enter harbor for rapidly handling supplies X 2 Higgins boats will guide ship in and patrol harbor entrance against motor torpedo boats X Can spare 40 cases hand grenades and 50 cases 37mm cannister

[REDACTED] ANNEX I (CONT)

29 August

- 0435 A number of enemy planes possibly three bombed positions around airfield dropped approximately twelve bombs with no damage
- 1200 Eighteen bombers escorted by Zeros bombed positions around airfield X Dropped approximately 24 bombs with slight damage to ammunition dumps
- 1315 From CG to All Units - All units will take immediate steps to improve protection for ammunition and fuel dumps. Dumps will be dug in and exposed surfaces of cases and drums covered with a layer of earth. The practice of covering small dumps with dried palm fronds will be discontinued and all dump areas will be kept clear of these and similar inflammable materials.
- 1455 From CG to Asst Div Comdr - Burrows Kopara and afirm prep dogs are under orders to unload here during daylight and at Ringbolt during hours of darkness X They will arrive Ringbolt this evening X Suggest unloading effort be on cargo you can use unloading minimum which must be transferred here later
- 1440 From USS BURROWS to CG - CO Guadalcanal / airport attached to your command 1440
- 2115 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Convoy arrived 1800 Stackpole will leave on Burrows but Spencer desires remain for present
- 2310 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Five cruisers left Faisi at Twelve thirty headed east at high speed X Reported by coast watcher X Burrows aground south east end of Tulagi X Unable get off before morning

30 August

- 1500 Approximately eighteen bombers attacked our ships off Red Beach X Calhoun sunk and others escaped damage In 1226 dogfight 18 Zeros were shot down

~~SECRET~~

ANNEX I (CONT)

- 1612 From CG to Asst Div Comdr - Send fifty VBX fifty VF mechanics X All aviation ordnance personnel Cactus soon as possible
- 1900 (Intercept) - Submarine report east of Maio Island close in shore
- 2055 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Plan unload Burrows to APDs and Kopara and send them Cactus daylight tomorrow further unloading to beach here X Attempt to pull Burrows off ten hundred tomorrow
- 2145 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Unloading forward hold Burrows to heighten bow X If floated there after will re-load gear and depart Cactus X Letter on Little details
- 1500 Our third group of planes arrived this afternoon consisted of SPDs (Dive Bombers) and Grumanns

31 August

- 0940 From CG to Asst Div Comdr - When transportation available transfer First Parachute Bn to Cactus
- 0950 (Intercept) Engine enemy seaplane shot down in flames
- 1000 From CG to Asst Div Comdr - My 301008 and 301033 combined and paraphrase X To lighten bow forward hold Burrows being unloaded X Will reload gear and depart for Cactus if floated X Letter on Little
- 1000 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Remainder Raider Bn being transferred Guadalcanal via Kopara and APDs early tomorrow
- 1010 From CG to Asst Div Comdr - Send boat with incendiary ammunition Cactus immediately utterly essential you accord this priority over all other activities
- 1215 (Intercept) - One enemy destroyer latitude 0630 longitude 159 course true 300 speed 20 knots time 2245
- 1237 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Unsuccessful attempt pull Burrows off X Continue unloading too beach X Try again later today X Request prompt air warning and maximum

[REDACTED] ANNEX I (CONT)

coverage Burrows

- 1350 From CTF63 to CG (All Island Bases) Three squadrons indicated compose first attack group 201 cruiser light enemy latitude 03099 longitude 159030 course (true) 310 time 2325
- 1620 From CG to Asst Div Comdr - Negat incendiary X Send starter shells also
- 1625 From USS Gregory to CG - At 1146 one four six plane crashed in vertical dive about one mile from this vessel then about midway between Lunga Point and Savo Island X Did not burn
- 1625 (Intercept) to all ships and stations One enemy destroyer latitude 0300 longitude 15910 bearing (relative) 235 speed 18 knots X Time 10 love I am still on mission assigned
- 1820 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Two yoke roger boats leave here sixteen thirty with incendiary ammunition X Have boat meet them to guide them to landing
- 1845 From CG to Asst Div Comdr - Did the Betelgeuse arrive if so at what time
- 2300 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Betelgeuse arrived 1700 X Burrows made unsuccessful attempt to pull off X Claims would have succeeded with aid ships pull astern X Will try again later X No pumping fuel oil aboard X 60 percent cargo unloaded X Request CTF62 be notified

1 September

- 0020 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Mag 23 Guadalcanal no repeat no starter cartridges available X Possibly 900 in squadron gear X Remainder believed aboard Long Island with pyrotechnics X Suggest action be taken obtain elsewhere X If emergency contact Tank Bn Guadalcanal X Understand they use same type cartridge X Ammunition and oxygen on Betelgeuse Scollins

**ANNEX I (CONT)**

- 0215 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Relay following from Betelgeuse to CTF62 X On schedule the Betelgeuse and Menley arrived first destination
- 1100 (Intercept) Seven enemy destroyers bearing (true) latitude 8 longitude 15747 Button enemy course 306 report weather conditions low attacking 0930
- 1145 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - For Col Wallace X Two thousand starved cartridges leaving immediately on Gregory believe other eight thousand can be located
- 1335 From Base Radio to CG - White flares sighted in small bay on San Cristobel Island position of 10 degrees 34 minutes south latitude 161 degrees 32 minutes east latitude 5 men on shore with yellow life raft believed to be americans continuing search
- 1340 From AirReconnaissance to CG - I am returning to ship time of arrival 1710 with Clark squadron 14 and 8 others one injured
- 1520 From Betelgeuse to CG - For ComGen Cactus X Request air search eastward through Lengo around Maulaca and north west end of San Cristobal X Desire report prior departure eighteen hundred love today One Sept

2 September

- 0245 From CG to Asst Div Comdr - Two enemy cruisers and one transport off Taivu Point X May have landed troops X Dive bombers attacking
- 0515 Unknown number of enemy planes bombed our positions last night with slight damage
- 1012 From CG to Asst Div Comdr - Destroyers landed more Japs at Taivu Point last night X Have Parachute Bn ready to join Edson X Will send APD's as soon as possible
- 1035 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Burrows still a ground X Continuing unloading X Urgently need Paragoric

~~SECRET~~

ANNEX I (CONT)

- 1143 From Air Reconnaissance to CG - Enemy vessel latitude 0715 longitude 15830 Time 2310
- 1200 (Intercept) Investigating suspicious vessels latitude 240 longitude 16018
- 1225 (Intercept) Opposed by enemy destroyer bombing it
- 1300 From Air Net to CG - Three possible battleship or heavy cruiser anchor Kietia X Have been opposed by AA gunfire
- 1315 (Intercept) Dropped number of bombs in attack as indicated X Returning to base
- 1335 (Intercept) One enemy transport hit X No other vessel sighted 2325
- 1745 From CG to All Units - The use of palm fronds to camouflage ammunition gasoline and other stores will be discontinued as it tends to spread fires
- 1925 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Burrows afloat at eighteen hundred X Request CTF62 be notified
- 2000 From Task Unit 62,2,4 to All CG Shore Bases - Submarine enemy fired torpedo Ringbolt X Searching
- 1130 Eighteen bombers escorted by zeros bombed positions around the airfield with slight damage to fuel dumps Few personnel injured

3 September

- 0955 From Base Radio to CG - Strafed three enemy landing boats latitude 068 (may be garbled) degrees 20 minutes south latitude 160 degrees 40 minutes east Time 2000
- 1015 (Intercept) Two men in small boat latitude 0745 longitude 164 degrees 54 (may be garbled) minutes Time 2140
- 1045 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Please inform us when Red condition is no longer in effect

~~SECRET~~  
ANNEX I (12)

[REDACTED] ANNEX I (CONT)

- 1050 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Burrows ran aground second time last night X Will transer Parachute Bn by YPs this morning X Your two two zero zero negative
- 1130 (Intercept) One unidentified aircraft latitude 7 longitude 16145
- 1150 From CG to Asst Div Comdr - Have Radar equipment found Gavutu shipped as soon as practicable to Naval reasearch lab Anacostia dog cast X Make reference ComSoPac twenty six eighteen hundred X Inform when and how shipped X Include any plans found
- 1312 From Base Radio to CG - Cactus fuel low
- 1313 From Base Radio to CG - Dropped two depth bombs submerged submarine no results latitude 0421 longitude 159 oppose
- 1700 (Intercept) Off Cactus all OK fourth fighting plane still in air believe will make it
- Q200 Shelled by submarine X Fired approximately six or eight shells with no damage
- 1505 From CG to Asst Div Comdr - For Comminron one Cast tare fox six two in his zero two zero five three eight releases Little and Gregory to Cactus X Desire embark detachment Raiders this evening X Please issue necessary orders to accomplish this

4 September

- 0600 From Little and Gregory to CG - CTF62 030916 X Reporting /HG
- 0820 From CG to Asst Div Comdr - Did Little and Gregory remain Ringbolt throughout the night
- 1040 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Due expected arrive other ships today impractical unload Fomalhaut tonight
- 1053 Report from Lt. Baldwin - At 0830 spotted one landing

~~SECRET~~ ANNEX I (CONT)

boat about 5 miles west of Ortega Channel on Santa Is-  
abel X Boat camouflaged with trees and branches X Strafed  
and dropped 100 lb bomb very close X Boat was beached and  
men took shelter in trees X Boat badly shot up X One  
large boat similar to a tug located in a cove about 3  
miles west of Ortega Straight X Dropped one 500 lb bomb  
very close to it X My wing men CacCafferty also dropped  
a 500 lb bomb but did not observe results X Strafed  
about 7 or 8 landing boats which were beached X Finished  
at 0900 X Returned to field at 0930 X Latitude 8 de-  
grees twenty minutes Longitude 159 degrees 20 minutes  
south and east

Am sending 12 bombers to attack immediately X Suggest  
that report be made immediately to Admiral McCain

- 1330 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - PBY arrived 1030 ready for operations on your flash
- 1540 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Will Fuller arrive here to-night for unloading
- 1630 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Your 040820 affirmative  
Ref: Did Little and Gregory arrive
- 1635 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Thirty caliber heavy machine gun ammunition chest belts and loading machine urgently needed X Request all available be sent X Believe two dash five may be in excess
- 1655 From CG to Asst Div Comdr - If Little and Gregory are in harbor direct Griffith to submit report on days operation X Advise
- 1720 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - YP boats will move to Cactus for unloading tomorrow X One has been aground all day
- 1910 From NOB to CG and Col Edson - Little and Gregory will patrol in Lunga Bay and to north west tonight.
- 2150 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Burrows discharging here to-night X YPs to Cactus tomorrow morning with cargo X Fomalhaut anchored

~~SECRET~~

SEC

ANNEX I (CONT)

5 September

- 0100 Our positions shelled by several destroyers approximately fifteen minutes
- 0155 From CG to Asst Div Comdr - Is PBY still there X Have been attempting all night to communicate with him
- 0420 (Intercept) from Air Command - Five enemy ships shelled Guadalcanal at 0100 X Have illuminated have been opposed by AA fire
- 0610 (Intercept) Five enemy ships shelled Cactus at 0100  
love X Reported retiring at 0230 X Report any contact  
(with) force radio Cactus for action contact (with)  
attack groups
- 0750 (Intercept) Five enemy ships anchored Cactus at 0100  
love X Reported retiring at 0230 X Report any contact  
this force radio Cactus for action maintain contact  
guide attack groups
- 1045 (Intercept) From Air Reconnaissance to Radio Guadalcanal - Latitude degrees 5 degrees 30 minutes longitude 158338 enemy ships course 290 speed 20 knots
- 1150 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Your 041835 resident com-  
missioner gave us code word X also assigned call baker  
inter tare X Now able to decipher coded messages X  
Lack of operators and facilities for charging batteries  
makes continuous watch impossible X Am listening to skeds  
only
- 1205 From Commander Dexter to CG - Request ComGen come aboard  
for conference unit commanding officer
- 1220 Burrows via Comdr Dexter - If you desire to confer with  
Commanding General come ashore
- 1255 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Lt Cobb in Catalina reports  
observation bombardment Kukum Beach 0210 X Laid curtain  
flares seaward enemy ship believed cruiser exploded burn-  
ed and sunk X Another ship burned short period X Were

~~SECRET~~

ANNEX I (CONT)

total five ships two or three twin turret ships X Encountered AA fire no damage X Ships retired westward along shore line X Suggest further details your observations.

- 1400 (Intercept) Enemy 4 engine seaplane latitude 0530 course 260 Time 1245 Love
- 2045 From USS Fomalhaut to CG - Please report movement Fomalhaut and escort to force Commander
- 2045 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - PBY damaged wing and rudder fueling X Unable operate tonight X Possibly repair tomorrow
- 2050 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Nothing to report
- 1315 Unknown number of bombers and zeros were reported over Guadalcanal dropped bombs along beach near Kukum X Two bombers and one zero was shot down

6 September

- 0700 From D-4 to Asst Div Comdr - Advise by dispatch amounts motor gas motor lube kerosene required by October first X Diesel may be obtained by refilling drums on AKs
- 1005 (Intercept) from Air Reconnaissance to Radio Guadalcanal - Two enemy destroyers position 810 south 158 10 east course 290 speed 15 knots 145 miles from Cactus
- 1045 (Intercept) From Air Reconnaissance One enemy flying boat three pursuit latitude 730 longitude 157 40 course 135 Time 845
- 1217 From ComAirSoPac to CG - (Radio Guadalcanal) Ten to twelve landing boats in bay latitude 0815 longitude 159 19
- 1155 From CG to Asst Div Comdr - Six option sail two unit planes are to be flown in and based Ringbolt probably arriving 8th or 9th X Please direct necessary facilities for moving and care of crews

~~SECRET~~ ANNEX I (CONT)

1345 (Intercept) Attacking four engine seaplane latitudes longitude 163 050

1407 (Intercept) Have ambulance at 3V40 AET 0142

7 September

0800 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Two WLs departed Ringbolt for Cactus 0635 with gasoline trucks and other aviation materials

0830 From D-4 to All Units - Fire truck is now available on call and may be procured by calling Triangle (Refer to message)

1030 (Intercept) 18 Landing barges 1 Torpedo boat on beach latitude 0830 longitude 159 38 strafed for twenty minutes damage unknown 0930

1410 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Unidentified motor sounds reported southwest of Tanavula Point

1445 From D-4 to Asst Div Comdr - Fuller and Bellatrix due Ringbolt dark eighth X Bellatrix may need working party for holds

1555 (Intercept) Bombing enemy submarine latitude 07 12 longitude 163 15

1555 (Intercept) Enemy submarine previously reported will not submerge dropped 2 bombs no damage X Visible latitude 7 12 longitude 163 14 X I am proceeding to base

8 September

0655 From Raider Bn to CG - First wave landing 0520 X Second coming ashore 0615 X No opposition X Speed embarkation we are moving out

0740 From Raider Bn to CG - Repeat bombing mission 0745 X Ten minute concentration X Troops apparently well armed and equipped

~~SECRET~~

**ANNEX I (CONT)**

- 0830 (Intercept) Ballard proceed rescue best speed 11  
9 keep contact until tender arrive
- 0855 From Raider Bn to CG - For 1st Mar Div BT came in back door X Overran two field pieces X Enemy withdrawing to Tasimboko strength unknown but evidently about as estimated X Keep bombers in air and give us mission soon as possible X Two crews to work guns would be valuable
- 1038 From CG to Raider Bn - Ten planes in three sections will continually support you X Have another squadron in case of emergency X Can be over you in about one hour X Flyer having difficulty identifying troops X One reports concentration two miles southwest Tasimboko X Will hit them if you say so
- 1045 From Raider Bn to CG - Request bombing mission coordinated with shell fire upon landing boats X APD give time X Have captured one more 75mm X At least 1000 life preservers overrun X Can troops be landed west of Tasimboko X If not request instructions regarding my embarkation
- 1056 From CG to Raider Bn - Landing troops west of Tasimboko not practicable X Reembark your battalion and return to Kukum.
- 1110 From CG to Raider Bn - Planes on station returned because of weather X Others standing by if needed to cover your reembarkation X Be certain to intercept ramp boat sent to get 37mm gun X Report completion reembarkation so planes can hit any target seen
- 1130 From Raider Bn to CG - Captured 46 field pieces X Advancing slowly against machine gun and rifle fire X Estimate at least 1000 well armed well equipped troops X Present position untenable after dark without landing and attack on other flank by additional troop X Have not yet reached Tasimboko need continual air support on enemy troops and must withdraw shortly X Hostile pressure increasing request instructions
- 1145 From CG to Raider Bn - Instructions to withdraw and reembark already issued your 1124

**ANNEX I (CONT)**

- 1155 (Intercept) Crew rescued I am returning to ship Time of arrival 1207
- 1200 From CG to Planes - APDs have located Jap landing boats they will open fire to indicate location planes destroy boats (Phoned to Pagoda) 1150
- 1220 From CG to Raider Bn - In order give better air support your withdrawal X Define your position with respect eastern end Tasimboko village
- 1305 From Raider Bn to CG - Immediate front am approaching east end Tasimboko with two companies third company moving in from south X Center to western edge village satisfactory targets
- 1410 (Intercept) Motor patrol boat Latitude 455 Longitude 162 50 attacking
- 1430 From CG to Raider Bn-(Col Edson) Your 1430 reembark and return to Kukum X Well done
- 1435 From Raider Bn to CG - Japs withdrew to southwest no contact since 1230 am destroying Tasimboko and as much property as possible X Will reembark about 1530 unless you desire we remain here until tomorrow
- 1605 From Base Radio to All Ships - Enemy submarine sighted 8 September position 11 45 south 163 43 east
- 1943 From CG to Asst Div Comdr - Any damage X Answer affirmative or negative plain language
- 2000 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Interrogatory all **clear** Interrogatory
- 2021 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Your one nine four three negative
- 2130 From CG to Asst Div Comdr - Ten DDs one cruiser headed this way can arrive about zero one hundred X Fuller and destroyers have been ordered to leave area

~~SECRET~~ ANNEX I (CONT)

2130 From CG to Asst Div Comdr - Yoke preps proceeding Ring-bolt two one three zero  
2215 From CG to Asst Div Comdr - Report immediate time departure Fuller and convoy  
2400 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Your 2216 departed 2130

9 September

0010 Planes attacked and bombed Tulagi Harbor from 0010 to 0100 with slight damage to YP boat  
0110 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Surface vessel shelling Tulagi Harbor  
0112 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Your 2015 PBY departed Ring-bolt 2400  
0755 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Unidentified aircraft headed toward Guadalcanal  
1015 From ComAirSoPac to CG - Nine enemy ships latitude south 0820 longitude east 157 50 report by Bl7  
1040 From ComAirSoPac to CG - One Battleship seven cruisers AA Heavy short force (Is one or part of one previously reported)  
1153 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Two planes lights on under 1000 feet dropped number of bombs as indicated X Two bombs near Fuller at 1915 X No damage zero zero thirty started search Tulagi Harbor YPs entering Harbor fired on by hostile ship X YP hit seriously damaged run aground X Casualties two seriously wounded one missing  
1200 From ComAirSoPac to Radio Guadalcanal - Enemy course 270  
1215 Approximately twenty five planes attacked and bombed positions around airfield with no damage

ANNEX I (CONT)

10 September

- 0015 Ships shelled Tulagi Harbor from 0015 to 0130 X No damage
- 0410 From CG to Asst Div Comdr - Report damage resulting hostile bombardment tonight
- 0550 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Your 0510 none
- 0710 From CG to Asst Div Comdr - Naval gunfire observed about 0015 to 0130 X Was Tulagi shelled X What vessels spent last night in Harbor
- 0900 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Jap destroyers fired about 50 rounds into Tulagi Harbor at 0015 X 2 YP boats in Harbor X No casualties no damage
- 1015 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - One YP with elements Third Defense and three WLs with aviation gear enroute Cactus this A.M. X YP prospect shelled again last night Total loss
- 1120 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - YP 239 departed for Cactus 1015 provide air coverage
- 1215 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Twenty Six bombers passed directly over Tulagi 15000 feet headed Southeast X Dropped one bomb in water near Blue Beach and two more mid-channel Tulagi - Guadalcanal X Twenty bombing planes returned over east Florida Island and headed west X Request your divflash air warnings and all clears X Have received some
- 1225 Twenty seven planes attacked and bombed positions around airfield X Slight damage and several personnel casualties
- 1337 From CG to All Units present Guadalcanal - Division CP officially closed at M320360 and reopened at 60.6 - 114.7 (1330 official time)
- 1400 (Intercept) Attacking enemy plane patrol

**ANNEX I (CONT)**

- 2300 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Due failure land Fifth Defense 40mm request permission retain four twentymm dual Third Defense here X One YP with elements Third Defense 3 WLS and 2 TRs to Cactus tomorrow A.M.
- 2303 From CG to Asst Div Comdr - Your one nine five zero retain three pedestal mount twenty mm

11 September

- 0010 From Base Radio to CG Island Bases and All U.S. Naval Ships - Enemy destroyer and cargo vessel bearing (true) 093 bombing
- 1245 Enemy bombers escorted by unknown number of zeros attacked and bombed positions around airfield X Several personnel casualties.
- 1310 (Intercept) Phoned to Base Radio to CG and All U.S. Naval Ships - Investigating suspicious vessels latitude 205 longitude 160 40
- 1555 From Radio Honolulu to ComAirSoPac All Ships and CG Island Bases - Sight enemy plane latitude 0520 longitude 163 35 Time 1335 Course 255 Speed 130
- 1555 From Base Radio to CG - Sighted approximately 50 enemy aircraft Lunga Point at 16000 feet was engaged (Intercept)
- 1600 From ComAirSoPac to Radio Guadalcanal-Request MO's and frequency from radio Guadalcanal

12 September

- 0245 From ComAirSoPac to CG and All Island Bases - Am being shelled
- 0805 (Intercept) Attacked by enemy planes Phoned to Pagoda at 0800
- 0900 (intercept) Three enemy cruisers and one destroyer at 0750 X Latitude 0757 longitude 157 40 Course 300 degrees X We were upon and missed continuing such Phoned to Pagoda at 0910

~~SECRET~~ ANNEX I (CONT)

- 1028 (Intercept) To Radio Guadalcanal - Two transports two  
destroyer enemy latitude south 06 40 longitude east  
158 10 Course 060 Speed 20 knots  
210 from Cactus 2155 GCT  
Phoned to Pagoda 1020
- 1150 Approximately twenty seven bombers escorted by zeros at-  
tacked and bombed positions around airfield X Slight dam-  
age and several personnel casualties X Dropped several  
incendiary bombs
- 1222 From VB to Field Hospital - Send ambulance to Raider CP  
at once
- 1300 From CG to All Units - The enemy is known to be operat-  
ing actively on both flanks of our position X The sit-  
uation demands aggressive patrol activity by all units  
in order to gain information and restrict hostile  
freedom of movement X In some instances patrols sent  
out have been too small to accomplish this combat mis-  
sion X hereafter, in the absence of specific authority  
from this Headquarters, no patrol which is less than one  
Rifle Company in strength will be sent beyond close  
supporting distance of our front lines
- 1355 From CG to CO 5th Marines - Reinforce 1st Amphibian  
Tractor Bn with one 60mm section for outpost duty prior  
1600 X Pass to Tractor CP
- 1425 From All U.S. Naval Ships to CG Island Bases - One en-  
emy carrier one cruiser course 195 Speed 18 knots turn-  
ing into wind
- 1700 From ComSoPac to CG All Island Bases Investigating sus-  
picious vessels latitude 013 04 longitude 167 30
- 1815 From D-4 to Asst Div Comdr - Fuller due to arrive Tulagi  
about 0800 14 September
- 1150 From ComAirSoPac to Any or All US Ships and CG All Is-  
land Bases - ?  
51 P 7 contact with carrier believed 0720 south 168 50  
east

~~SECRET~~

ANNEX I (CONT)

- 2230 Positions shelled by approximately 4 destroyers and 2 cruisers X Firing continued until 0330 X Cruiser planes flew over area until daybreak
- 2305 From Base Radio to CG - Am attempting to reestablish contact 2 ships Bearing 011 Distance 320 Course 265 Speed 20 knots

13 September

- 0400 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Our 5 inch illuminated suspected hostile ships which appeared to be very fast and maneuverable
- 0440 From Base Radio to CG - Two enemy ships may pass close to Apricot about 0200 Love 13th garbles threatened returning Button White made report immediately air borne X Otherwise take off at dawn for garbles aircraft at Vanlkr maneuvered plane bombing daylight for Button
- 0700 From CG to Asst Div Comdr - Lots of fireworks here but we are alright X How are you
- 1034 (Intercept) Amphibian planes at Racido Bay
- 1100 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Watched your show but no hostile fire here X YP departed 0730 X Third Defense move complete today X Will work on aviation material with YP's and when Fuller unloaded will resume WL's and TR's
- 1145 From ComAirSoPac to CG Island Bases - Investigating suspicious vessels 9 degrees 30 minutes latitude 166 degrees 40 minutes longitude
- 1200 From ComAirSoPac to CG Island Bases - Four engine bomber bearing 324 distance 530 miles from Button
- 1220 From Comdr Dexter to CG - Don Innes picked up by YP 239 and landed at Kukum X Sent to Division Field Hospital with burns X Dexter
- 1230 From Base Radio to CG All Island Bases - Two enemy cruisers 930 166 40 Course 30 Speed 20 knots

~~SECRET~~

ANNEX I (CONT)

- 1240 (Intercept) Sighted Ten enemy ships latitude 07 longitude 16 ?
- 1400 From Base Radio to CG - Four more ships sighted may be more types also unknown smoke on horizon in two places latitude 0700 longitude 164 05 X Ten miles east wo more ships
- 1430 From ComAirSoPac to CG Shore Bases - Attacked by air-craft enemy float seaplane latitude 07 longitude 163
- 1500 From Base Radio to CG - Thirteen enemy ships Course 160 Speed 25 knots two cruisers in column two destroyers and three cruisers column close screen of six destroyers force
- 1610 (Intercept) Many unidentified (ships)? latitude 6 045 longitude 163 048
- 1710 (Intercept) Sight one engine landplane bearing 345 Distance 200 unidentified
- 1807 From 2nd Bn Fifth Marines to CG - Lines established a-long road and in field as directed X 60 x 3 / 114 x 6
- 1900 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Estimated 45 days ration on hand X More accurate count follows few days X YP de-parts 0730 with aviation material will need working party on board  
Request air coverage
- 2100 Approximately 2100 positions were attacked by Japanese troops X Several patrols were reported and contact was made with various battalions X Continued throughout the night X Several casualties were reported

14 September

- 0105 From CG to Asst Div Comdr - Send one Battalion Cactus this morning
- 0245 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Your 140105 request refer us use Fuller prior unloading X Advise

**ANNEX I (CONT)**

- 0815 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - YP departed with one Rifle Company less one platoon at 0730 X Also aviation ammunition
- 0850 From CG to Asst Div Comdr - Had hard fight here last night with force which attempted to come in our rear and on right flank X Condition satisfactory but need more infantry X Explain to escort commander urgency of getting battalion here X Reply in clear yea or no if he will bring them
- 1000 From ComSoPac to Radio Guadalcanal - One small unidentified aircraft latitude 10 30 longitude 168 72 Course 190
- 1000 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Request maximum time air warnings today for benefit Fuller X Fuller listened Division net ? call Afirm Baker
- 1045 (Intercept) Unidentified single float seaplane latitude 9 13 longitude 163 05
- 1224 From CG to Asst Div Comdr - Will battalion referred to in my 0850 arrive today
- 1245 From ComAirSoPac to CG Island Bases and All Ships - One carrier enemy three cruisers enemy four destroyers latitude 0630 longitude 164 17 Course (true) 160 Speed (knots) 25
- 1440 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Your 1224 affirmative
- 1530 From ComSoPac to ComAirSoPac Info CTF61, 62 - Can you search sector 015 to 045 from Button? X Unengaged planes too sure enemy force approaching from that sector
- 1535 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Your 0850 X Am using Belatrix X Departed about 1430
- 1551 From CG to All Units - Division CP will be temporarily located at old location until further orders
- 2055 From CG to Asst Div Comdr - Expedite transfer remainder battalion Cactus in yoke prep boat early tomorrow morning

ANNEX I (CONT)

15 September

- 0145 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Fuller and escort with working party departed X Destination unknown X Bellatrix and escort have departed X Third Defense Battalion Second Marines aboard X Where abouts unknown
- 0145 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Bellatrix departed sixteen hundred X Part of Battalion loaded X Have boats ready to unload X Will send remainder yoke prep tomorrow
- 0630 From CG to Asst Div Comdr - YP with troops landed here last night  
Also sent to Bellatrix
- 0855 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Due present emergency has ordered use of damaged YP X Navy here ordered not to use by Navy Guadalcanal
- 1430 From CG to All Units - Hereafter all reports made by unit observers of personnel regarding presence or proximity of hostile aircraft will first be made directly to the Pagoda by the person concerned
- 2230 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Two YPs with ? gas and remainder 2d Bn 2d Marines two WLs dash one Tr with aviation material depart for Guadalcanal tomorrow AM X Request air coverage from 0700

16 September

- 0810 From CG to Asst Div Comdr - Aviation reported presence small boat entered Tulagi Harbor 1230 Fifteenth X Report presence and type boat
- 0930 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Your zero eight two eight X Was tare roger bringing detachment from Tanuvula Point
- 1020 From CG to Asst Div Comdr - Urgent X Using all boats including damaged yoke prep send Avgas here X Acknowledge receipt and report amount being sent
- 1101 From CG to Asst Div Comdr - Report immediately amount Avgas Ringbolt after compliance with my ten twenty

[REDACTED] ANNEX I (CONT)

- 1400 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Your 1020 have sent 212 drums via YPs this AM X Will send all remains 161 drums via YP tomorrow
- 1930 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Damaged YP ordered to cease running through Commander Dexter has loaded YP challenger with 108 drums gasoline have 53 drums left X Advise
- 1940 From CG to Asst Div Comdr - Dexter has been told that gasoline must come here tomorrow X If tank lighter inadequate damaged YP must be used

17 September


- 1100 From CG to All Units - The carrying or firing of captured weapons by any person is strictly forbidden
- 1415 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Am sending two boats to Nagatanois Island to capture seven Jap aviators X Boats leave sixteen hundred X Request air coverage X Advise
- 1550 From CG to Asst Div Comdr - Send all Tare Roger and William Love boats to Cactus tomorrow X Boats to depart at dawn but not before daybreak
- 1615 From CG to Asst Div Comdr - My 1550 also send Yoke Prep X All boats to be empty
- 1747 From CG to Asst Div Comdr - Walrus Amphibian from Hypo Mike Sail Leander may land Tulagi tomorrow friday for fuel

18 September

- 0735 From CG to All Units - Upon complete debarkation of all troops and supplies of 7th Marines reinforced reinforcing units will revert to parent organizations X All parent units establish liaison with 7th Marines X CO 7th Marines inform Div Hdqs completion debarkation X Reinforcing units being debarked consist of 1st Eng Bn 11th Marines Company C Tanks Company B Company Eng Company B Transport minus Company C Medical

**ANNEX I (CONT)**

- 1700 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Request friendly ships and planes challenge and recognition signals for next twenty four hours
- 2040 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - YP departs daylight tomorrow with five inch ammunition aviation material and six Jap aviation prisoners
- 2010 From Comdr Task Force 65 to CG Cactus - For Com Gen Cactus X Bellatrix will not repeat not return to Cactus tomorrow X No local air coverage required



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SITUATIONS OVERLAY 1ST. MARINES  
FOR AUGUST 21, 1942  
TO ACCOMPANY D-2 MAP 104  
SHOWING 1ST BN. MOVEMENT DURING  
BATTLE OF TENARU

**MAP 104**  
NORTH COAST GUADALCANAL  
LUNGA AREA

Traced from Aerial Photographs of 18 August 1942  
By H&S-11  
Arbitrary 1000 yard Grid System  
Average Scale 1:20,750  
Roads and Trails by Inspection

Sheet 2 of 12 Sheets

